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GENDER AND THE SHARING ECONOMY
Naomi Schoenbaum*
ABSTRACT
While the sharing economy has been celebrated as a flexible
alternative to traditional employment for those with family
responsibilities, especially women, it presents challenges for gender
equality. Many of the services that are “shared” take place in the
context of intimacy, which can have substantial consequences for
transacting, particularly by enhancing the importance of identity of
both the worker and the customer. Expanding on previous research on
intimate work—a critical area that exists largely in limbo between the
law of the market and the law of the family—this Article explores the
significance of intimacy in the sharing economy and the implications
for its regulation of the sharing economy and for sex equality. It argues
that the intimacy of many sharing economy transactions heightens the
salience of sex to these transactions, in tension with sex discrimination
law’s goal of reducing the salience of sex in the labor market. But even
if existing sex discrimination law extends to these transactions, the
intimacy of the transactions again limits the law’s ability to promote
gender equality in the same transformative way that it has in the
traditional economy. The sharing economy thus raises serious
concerns for proponents of sex equality.
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INTRODUCTION
The sharing economy has been hailed as a job creator and
celebrated for offering flexibility that can benefit all workers, but
especially women.1 Much of the language used to describe the
possibilities of the sharing economy for workers is that of liberation
from the confines of the traditional workaday world and freedom to
create one’s own productive experience, which might be particularly
important to women workers, who have historically been
shortchanged when it comes to the rewards of work.2 Specifically, the
1. See Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom and
Uncertainty,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
16,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economyworkers-find-both-freedom-and-uncertainty.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/K67HAHHW].
2. Id.; see also Paul Merrion, Making Inroads: Women Cabbies on the Rise, CRAIN’S
CHICAGO
BUSINESS
(Sept.
27,
2014),
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idea that work can be done largely outside of a standard workplace,
and often at home (either the worker’s or the customer’s), and be fit
into small parcels of a worker’s time, has been seen to be a particularly
good fit for workers with significant family care responsibilities, who
are overwhelmingly women.3 The sharing economy’s merging of home
and work harkens back to an earlier era when women were less likely
to labor in a formal workplace, and more likely to work from their own
or someone else’s home.4 Even the term “sharing” suggests the
traditionally feminine value of cooperation over the traditionally
masculine value of competition.5 In light of this seeming synergy
between women workers and the sharing economy, is the sharing
economy in fact a boon to women’s equality?6
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140927/ISSUE01/309279976/makinginroads-women-cabbies-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/3W77-B973].
3. Id.
4. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J. LAW & FEMINISM
51, 54 (1997) (describing how at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century,
“[k]eeping boarders was a lucrative source of income for women,” and how women at
this time “engaged in industrial home work, doing paid piecework in their homes, such
as sewing garments, typing documents, or rolling cigars”).
5. Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 71-73, 98-99
(1995) (referencing sources that type competition as a masculine value and
cooperation as a feminine value).
6. This is an especially important question for urban areas, where the bulk of
sharing economy activity takes place. See Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The
Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. ___ (forthcoming
2016) (arguing that the sharing economy “is fundamentally an urban phenomenon”
due to the “density, proximity, specialization, and even anonymity that mark city life”);
Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Governmental Policy: The
Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy,” George Mason University Law and
Economics
Research
Paper
Series
15-01,
at
5,
http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications/working_papers/1501.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JX67-L6FK] (highlighting how the density of urban spaces underlies
the sharing economy). In this way, this Article contributes to the literature on the
relationship between gender and geography. See, e.g., Lisa Pruitt, Gender, Geography &
Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUSTICE 338 (2008) (arguing that geography is
important for understanding gender equality and focusing specifically on the issues
that face rural women); Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1165,
1227-31 (arguing that urban spaces can enhance gender equality by providing greater
density of labor market opportunities for both husband and wife, reducing the need for
long-distance moves that tend to negatively affect women’s workplace equality);
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and WorkFamily Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 1826 (2007) (arguing that suburban
sprawl—the increasing distance between home and work—hinders women’s
workplace equality due to longer commute times that not only impact the ability to
balance work and family but also tend to disproportionately limit women’s job
opportunities and suggesting that denser urban areas can thus enhance women’s
equality). This Article helps to highlight the complex relationship between geography
and gender equality. On the one hand, by providing a dense labor market that reduces
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While the regulation of the sharing economy has received scholarly
attention, little attention has been paid to the question of identity in
the sharing economy, and especially to gender.7 Within this literature,
scholars disagree on how much—if at all—the sharing economy
changes the regulatory landscape across several areas of law.8 Much of
the existing scholarship is focused on the descriptive question of
whether and to what extent current law governs sharing economy
transactions.9 But this focus tends to sidestep the critical normative
consideration of the consequences of applying existing regulation to
this changed context, including whether existing law will achieve its
aims when applied in these sometimes quite different circumstances.
This Article concerns itself with this consideration in the context of sex
discrimination law and sex equality.
Building on prior work on intimate work,10 this Article explains how
the intimate nature of much of the transacting in the sharing economy

the need for long-distance moves and for long commutes, urban spaces alleviate some
of the work-family tensions that contribute to women’s lack of labor market equality.
See Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, supra, at 1227-31; Silbaugh, supra, at 1826. On
the other hand, as this Article explores, if the sharing economy takes hold even more
strongly as a source of work in cities, urban spaces may exacerbate the salience of sex
at work, undermining women’s labor market equality.
7. See, e.g., id.; Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE
85
(2015),
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogu
e/Rogers_Dialogue.pdf [https://perma.cc/2322-AKWG]; Deborah F. Buckman, Liability
and Regulation of Ride-Sharing Services Using Social Media, 6 A.L.R. 7th Art. 1 (June
2015); Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the
Sharing
Economy,
BOSTON
B.J.
(Spring
2014),
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/04/01/whats-old-becomes-new-regulating-thesharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/R7KT-XDAF]; Catherine Lee Rassman,
Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling Innovation: Examining the Drivers, The Insurance
“Gap”, and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on Board, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81
(2014).
8. Compare, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L.
REV.
___
(forthcoming
2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2570584
[https://perma.cc/A438-B45Q] (arguing in the tax context that current law is
adequate to regulate the sharing economy), with Abbey
Steimer, Betwix and Between: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB.
L.J.
___
(forthcoming
2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535656
[https://perma.cc/BC5V-AF47] (arguing that the sharing economy “does not fit within
existing legal frameworks”).
9. An important exception includes Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean Caring?
Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH 1 (2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492798
[https://perma.cc/QXK3-EFUT].
10. Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167 (2015).
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heightens the salience of sex to both buyers and sellers there. This is
troubling for the legal sex equality project, whose goal has generally
been to make sex less salient in the market.11 And, importantly, simply
extending existing sex discrimination law to the sharing economy may
not alleviate these troubles.
As transactions increasingly occur in a space that blurs the
traditional distinctions of home and market, not only is the salience of
sex heightened, but also the law’s ability to address it is cabined.12 So
even if sex discrimination law applies to the sharing economy, the
more intimate nature of these transactions—and the consequences of
intimacy for the operation of this law—limits the law’s ability to have
the transformative effect that it has had in the traditional economy.13
While some may celebrate a realm of market transactions with greater
freedom to express intimate preferences, this expanded realm of
freedom risks undermining the project of sex equality by reifying the
salience of sex in the market.
While this Article raises concerns about the impact of the sharing
economy for women’s equality, it should not be read as a
condemnation of the sharing economy in general or even for women.
Surely, the sharing economy enhances utility, including women’s
utility, in a variety of ways. More analysis is required to assess on
balance the impact of the sharing economy on women’s welfare. This
Article is meant only as a first intervention to raise some of the
challenges that the sharing economy presents for gender equality.
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, this Article sets forth
the case for the heightened significance of identity in the sharing
economy based on the intimacy of the transactions that occur there. It
begins by explaining how transactions in the sharing economy take on
a more intimate cast than transactions in the traditional economy.
First, the place of sharing economy transactions confers intimacy.
Sharing economy transactions often transcend the boundaries of home
and market in that they occur in a seller’s or buyer’s private space.

11. See generally Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENVER UNIV.
L. REV. 995 (2015) (arguing that the success of employment discrimination law in
promoting sex equality in the market has been due to reducing the salience of sex by
challenging essentialist notions of sex difference); infra note 102 and accompanying
text.
12. See infra Part I.A.1.
13. See Janet Nadler & Kenworthey Bilz, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in MORAL
COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 101 (D.
Medin, et al., eds., 2009); John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus
Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J.
ECON. LIT. 1603 (1991).
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Second, sharing economy firms rely on intimacy as a risk-reducing
mechanism that confers trust. This intimacy then magnifies the
significance of the identity of buyers and sellers to a transaction.
Identity traits serve as powerful signals of the type of services a seller
provides or the type of customer the buyer will be, and intimacy
intensifies preferences for the types of traits that identity signals.
Sharing economy firms’ personalization of transactions only heightens
the significance of buyers’ and sellers’ identities, and the private spaces
in which much of the transacting occurs allow discriminatory
preferences to flourish largely unchecked.
In Part II, this Article turns to focus specifically on the salience of sex
in the sharing economy. This Part begins by looking at sex preferences
in the sharing economy, and identifies four interests that underlie
these preferences: privacy interests; preferences for comfort and even
pleasure; the desire for a space free of sexuality; and safety concerns.
This Part then catalogs the various manifestations of the salience of sex
in the sharing economy. From discrimination to segregation, what is
perhaps most notable about these manifestations is how often they
take the form of express sex-based preferences or distinctions, rather
than the sorts of unconscious biases and subtle discrimination that
have dominated much recent scholarship on discrimination.14 This
suggests that our norms do not yet consider sex-based discrimination
in market transactions that are marked by intimate or social features
to be overly problematic.
In Part III, this Article looks at the consequences of the salience of
sex in the sharing economy. The increasing blurring of home and work
that the sharing economy creates presents challenges for legal
regulation and the goals of sex equality. This Part begins with a
normative evaluation of the salience of sex in the sharing economy. It
considers both the promise and the threat of this phenomenon to the
larger goals of the sex equality project of the market, concluding that
the threat outweighs the promise. Part III then assesses the ability of
existing law to combat the salience of sex in the sharing economy. It
first addresses the uncertainty surrounding the application of existing
sex discrimination law to the sharing economy. It then explores how
the market has responded in the face of this legal uncertainty and
concludes that market responses alone have thus far been inadequate
to constrain the salience of sex in the sharing economy, and indeed
have often had the opposite effect. Even if current antidiscrimination
laws were to apply to the sharing economy, the intimacy and other

14. See sources cited infra note 20.
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structural features of sharing-economy transactions would sharply
limit the promise of such laws to have the transformative effect on sex
equality that they have had in the traditional economy. Regardless
then of whether current law extends to the sharing economy, the
sharing economy should raise serious concern for proponents of sex
equality. This Part concludes with a few words on new directions the
law might take to address this concern.
I. INTIMACY AND IDENTITY IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
The sharing economy heightens the salience of the identity of both
sellers and buyers because of the increased intimacy of the
transactions therein. This Part first describes the intimacy of sharing
economy transactions, and then explains how intimacy makes identity
more salient.
A.

Intimacy

The sharing economy tends to encompass more intimate
transactions than the traditional economy for two reasons. First, the
place of the transaction confers intimacy.
Sharing economy
transactions tend to merge home and market in that they occur in the
seller’s or buyer’s private car or home. Second, sharing economy firms
rely on intimacy as a risk-reducing mechanism that confers trust. To
overcome the riskiness of sharing economy transactions, sharing
economy firms rely not on firm reputation or other guarantees by the
firm, but rather by making transactions more intimate, that is, by
predicating transactions on personal information about buyers and
sellers. These mechanisms are discussed in turn.
1.

Place

Transactions in the sharing economy are often more intimate than
transactions in the traditional economy because of where they take
place, outside of the traditional workplace. Perhaps the most defining
feature of the sharing economy is that it enables the disaggregation of
the sale of one’s property (e.g., cars, homes) and labor.15 When it
comes to property, this means that sellers are able to sell segments of
their own personal property, such as rooms in their homes or rides in
their cars, for short segments of time. When it comes to labor, this
means that sellers are able to sell smaller segments of their labor. The
sale of disaggregated personal property often entails a seller having

15. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 5–6.
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someone come into her home (AirBnB) or her car (Uber).16 The sale of
disaggregated personal labor often entails a seller providing labor in
the buyer’s home (TaskRabbit or Kitchensurfing).17
The rise of the sharing economy then challenges the traditional
sociological division between the “first place,” which is the home, the
“second place,” which is the workplace, and the “third place,” which are
communal spaces generally open to the public that may or may not be
part of the market.18 Some sharing economy transactions merge the
first and second places. For example, TaskRabbit, which allows
consumers to hire “taskers” to complete a variety of tasks in their
homes, renders the same space—the consumer’s home—the second
place for the worker and the first place for the consumer.19 Other
sharing economy transactions bring more merging of the first and
third places. For example, ride-sharing services render the same
space—the seller’s car—the first place for workers (albeit in a private
car rather than a private home) and the third place for consumers.
Finally, some sharing economy transactions merge the first, second,
and third places. For example, AirBnB and other home-sharing
services render the same space—the seller’s home—the first and
second places for the owner (who is working in her own home) and the
third place for the consumer.20
To be sure, it is not the case that these places are always neatly
divided in the traditional economy. Much service work in the
traditional economy blurs the second and third places: the same
setting, for example, a hair salon, is a second place for the worker and a

16. About Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/GZ6BQ8LC];
About
Us,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us
[https://perma.cc/2KU4-PKBR].
17. See TASKRABBIT https://www.taskrabbit.com/ [https://perma.cc/7ENH-D4B9];
KITCHENSURFING, https://www.kitchensurfing.com/ [https://perma.cc/A4ZC-KRYW] (“a
professional chef cooks in your kitchen once a week so you can cross dinner off your to
do list”); “Uber” Your Cooking; The Sharing Economy Comes to Your Kitchen, FORBES
(May 13, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/thehartmangroup/2015/05/13/uberyour-cooking-the-sharing-economy-comes-to-your-kitchen/ [https://perma.cc/XQ49TMFK].
18. See generally RAY OLDENBURG, THE GREAT GOOD PLACE: CAFES, COFFEE SHOPS,
COMMUNITY CENTERS, BEAUTY PARLORS, GENERAL STORES, BARS, HANGOUTS, AND HOW THEY GET
YOU THROUGH THE DAY (1999) (coining the term “third place,” and distinguishing it from
the “first place” and the “second place”); Leo W. Jeffres et al., The Impact of Third Places
on Community Quality of Life, 4 APPLIED RESEARCH IN QUALITY OF LIFE 333, 334 (2009)
(listing as third places, inter alia, community centers, senior centers, coffee shops and
cafes, bars and pubs, restaurants, shopping centers, stores, malls, markets, hair salons,
barber and beauty shops, recreation centers, YM/WCA, pools, movie theaters).
19. See TASKRABBIT, supra note 17.
20. See About Us, AIRBNB, supra note 16.

2016]

GENDER AND THE SHARING ECONOMY

9

third place for the consumer.21 And domestic service work blurs the
first and second places: the same setting—the consumer’s home—is
the second place for the worker and the first place for the consumer.22
The point then is not that this blurring is entirely new or unique to the
sharing economy, but that the size of the sharing economy calls these
boundaries into question more than ever before, as more production
and exchange occurs in private spaces.23 This shift in the place of
productivity to private settings might be viewed as a return to the preIndustrial Revolution era, when much production was done in the
home.24 This shift has significance for legal regulation, to which I
return in Part III. Here, my focus is on explaining how this shift makes
transactions in the sharing economy more intimate.
Sociologists have defined intimate interactions as those that depend
on “particularized knowledge received, and attention provided by, at
least one person–knowledge and attention that are not widely
available to third parties.”25
The knowledge is not ordinary
knowledge, but knowledge of special types of information such as
“shared secrets, interpersonal rituals, bodily information, awareness of
personal vulnerability, and shared memory of embarrassing
situations.”26 Nor is the attention ordinary attention, but attention that
encompasses “such elements as terms of endearment, bodily services,
private languages, emotional support, and correction of embarrassing
defects.”27
The direct interaction between buyer and seller in more personal
spaces makes these transactions intimate, giving access to private
information that is not typically shared with others. And the
placement of these services in personal spaces primes the interactions
to take on a more intimate character beyond the information that is
revealed simply by virtue of the fact that the interaction takes place
there. Without the structure and signals of a third-party firm in an
21. This lends unique dynamics to much of this work. See Schoenbaum, supra note
10, at 1194, 1213.
22. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 60–61.
23. John Hawsworth & Robert Vaughan, PWC, THE SHARING ECONOMY—SIZING THE
REVENUE
OPPORTUNITY
(2015),
http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharingeconomy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.html
[https://perma.cc/Q4HB-83VU]
(estimating the potential value of the five main sharing economy sectors to be $335
billion by 2015).
24. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1983).
25. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 14-15 (2005).
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id.
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office setting mediating the transaction, buyers and sellers tend to fall
back on the scripts of personal interaction in unregulated spaces like
the home.28
Note that not all transactions in the sharing economy are intimate,
and of those that are intimate, some are more intimate than others.
For example, one might rent out an apartment that one does not live in
through AirBnB. Unless the apartment owner chooses to meet the
AirBnB renter or to include personal items in the apartment (e.g.,
photographs or mementos), this transaction would not be intimate. An
AirBnB owner who rents out a room in her home with a shared
bathroom engages in a more intimate transaction than one who rents
out a separate apartment within her home. Likewise, Uber drivers and
those who ride with them can, to a large extent, choose how intimate to
make their transactions by deciding how much information to reveal in
conversation. Some riders have chosen to make their transactions
with ride-share drivers far more intimate, by, for example, sharing
personal information and even changing in the backseat of the car.29
2.

Trust

Transactions are risky. Market transactions present risks for
sellers—whether they will be compensated for the goods or services
they sell—and for buyers—whether they will get the goods or services
they bargained for. In addition to these basic risks of transacting,
buyers and sellers may face additional risks, such as the safety risk that
arises when the transaction is face-to-face. Searching for appropriate
persons with whom to transact and assessing the reliability of market
strangers involves significant transaction costs.30 Firms help to
mitigate these costs by building trust based on reputation.31

28. Marjorie L. De Vault, Home and Work: Negotiating Boundaries through Everyday
Life, 102 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1491, 1491 (1997) (book review).
29. See Winnie Hu, She Rides, a New York Taxi Service Aimed at Women, Finds a
Loyal
Following,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
11,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/nyregion/new-york-taxi-service-aimed-atwomen-finds-loyal-following.html [https://perma.cc/QQU4-JVVS].
30. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 9; see also The rise of the sharing
economy: On the internet, everything is for hire, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-risesharing-economy [https://perma.cc/YGJ6-94RZ].
31. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of
Airbnb.com 3 (Harvard Business School, Working Paper 14-054, 2014),
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/digital-discrimination-the-case-of-airbnb-com
[https://perma.cc/KGY6-8UFC]; PWC, The Sharing Economy, Consumer Intelligence
Series
16,
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/assets/pwcconsumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VK2V-
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In the sharing economy, technology has reduced the firm’s role in
matching buyers and sellers.32 The term “peer-to-peer” economy,
sometimes used to describe the sharing economy, nicely captures this.
The sharing economy lowers transactions costs associated with
matching consumers and producers, and these lowered transaction
costs allow for the disaggregated consumption of goods and services.33
Although such disaggregated consumption can take place through the
use of mediating firms, and they long have (e.g., hotels, car rental
companies), technology allows expansion of this model to enable more
and more casual disaggregation of consumption. This means that firms
are relied on less, and transactions are based more on relationships
between the consumer and producer.34 This fact already makes
sharing economy transactions more personal.
With these more personal transactions and risks, the resulting need
for trust remains. Sharing economy firms like Uber and AirBnB that
connect buyers and sellers mediate some risks both by reputation and
policy, but much less so than in the traditional economy. This leads to
the need for alternative sources of trust necessary for markets to
operate.35
One of the primary ways of engendering trust in the sharing
economy is by making transactions between producers and consumers
more personal: by replacing the trust placed in the firm with trust
placed in individual sellers and buyers.36
Sharing economy
transactions are often made to turn on the individual’s characteristics.
For many services, either sellers or buyers or both create profiles that
reveal information about themselves, including their names and
photographs.37 Both buyers and sellers can rate each other, and these
56XX] (citing that “69% [of consumers surveyed] say they will not trust sharing
economy companies until they are recommended by someone they trust”). Of course,
in addition to the role of reputation, law also places burdens on firms (and individuals)
that reduce risks to sellers and buyers. I return to a discussion of the role of law in
Part III.
32. Id.
33. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 9.
34. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 97 (discussing how Uber drivers need to establish
“micro-relationships” to earn certain ratings).
35. Rachel Botsman, The Currency of the New Economy is Trust, TED Talk (June
2012),
http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_tru
st?language=en (“The currency of the new economy is trust.”).
36. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 9.
37. See Airbnb Help, Why do I need to have an Airbnb profile or profile photo?,
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/67/why-do-i-need-to-have-an-airbnbprofile-or-profile-photo [https://perma.cc/4MRG-7PZX]; see Jamiev2014, “Putting the
“Pro”
in
Profile,
TASKRABBIT
BLOG
(Apr.
10,
2013),
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ratings feature prominently in online profiles.38 This intensifies the
shift of focus of the transaction from one with the sharing economy
firm to one between the individual buyer and seller.39
With this focus on the transaction between the buyer and the seller
often comes a sense of social or personal connection between the two
that sharing economy firms emphasize.40 Indeed, some firms market
themselves specifically on a model of intimacy. Lyft, a ride-sharing
competitor to Uber, has used the tagline: “your friend with a car.”41
Tripda, a long-distance ride-sharing platform has emphasized the
social nature of the service: “Why travel alone? Carpool instead!
Sharing a ride is fun & social. We connect you with new and interesting
people to share a ride with, while saving on your travel costs!”42
AirBnB has also marketed itself as a great way to meet people,
including romantic partners.43
https://blog.taskrabbit.com/2013/04/10/putting-the-pro-in-profile/
[https://perma.cc/68QP-Z2XG].
38. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 9; see Uber Help, How are Ratings
Calculated, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/66ce3340-aa1f-4357-b955-027ef50441d3
[https://perma.cc/6RQF-7BT6].
39. See In the Battle Between Lyft And Uber, The Focus Is On Drivers, NPR ALL TECH
CONSIDERED
(Jan.
18,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/01/18/463473462/is-ubergood-to-drivers-it-s-relative [https://perma.cc/8WML-6MXQ]. And as the founder of
RelayRides, a car-sharing market-place noted, “You meet great, interesting people. You
have great stories.” See Singer, supra note 1.
40. One article raised concerns about the sharing economy for those with autism,
who tend to want to avoid intimacy. See Lynne Soraya, Disability and the Sharing
Economy,
PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY
(Aug.
11,
2014),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/aspergers-diary/201408/disability-and-thesharing-economy [https://perma.cc/9A7S-3BPH].
For those with anti-intimacy
preferences, the personalization of transactions in the sharing economy raises anxiety
about the expectations for intimate interaction in such transactions. It is acceptable to
sit silently in a taxi, but perhaps not when one uses Uber or Lyft. Given the
expectations of intimacy, a passenger’s ratings may be affected by his anti-intimacy
preference if she chooses not to engage with her driver. The same concerns on the flip
side could be raised for drivers with autism.
41. Jason Tanz, How AirBnB and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each Other,
WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-economy/
[https://perma.cc/V8WV-279N].
42. How It Works, SHARING TRIP, http://sharingtrip.in/how-it-work.html#
[https://perma.cc/C8GH-K5EH]. Tripda ceased operations in February 2016. TRIPDA,
https://tripda.com/ [https://perma.cc/47J4-QXF6].
43. Host, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host [https://perma.cc/5B2V-5XB8]
(“Besides the extra income, hosts join a supportive worldwide community”); When
Strangers Meet: An Airbnb Love Story, AIRBNB BLOG (Feb. 13, 2015),
http://blog.airbnb.com/strangers-to-soul-mates-couples-who-met-through-airbnb/
[https://perma.cc/Z7PU-99MB?type=image ] (“This is part of our special series ‘When
Strangers Meet’. Have you met someone special through a chance encounter on
Airbnb? Friend, husband, wife, long lost soul mate: we want to hear your story. It
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The intended level of intimacy of the transaction may vary by the
sharing economy firm offering the service. A driver who worked
through both Uber and Lyft emphasizes the more personal relationship
that Lyft tries to cultivate between its drivers and riders as compared
with Uber:
[Uber] recommends that drivers “wear a collared shirt and generally
look professional.” They also advise that drivers should open the door
and put bags in the trunk.
Lyft, conversely, encourages uniqueness. Drivers are musicians,
artists, and entrepreneurs like myself (among many other paths), and
their personalities come through via their clothing and their cars.
Drivers create goofy concepts, such as the Disco Lyft, the Karaoke
Lyft, and the Chalkboard Lyft. Cars are still clean and safe, but rides
are treated as an opportunity for an experience . . . . Lyft encourages
you to be a good friend. Provide a clean car, have fun, and don’t let
your pal down. The culture is goofy, fun, unique, and irreverent, just
like a true bud. You’re encouraged to be yourself and have fun. Uber
wants you to be a chauffeur and to treat the role as a career. It’s run
with military precision and professionalism is encouraged from
drivers.44

B.

Identity

As a general matter, whether in the traditional or sharing economy,
intimacy tends to breed discrimination. Intimacy enhances the
salience of the particular worker and her identity to the consumer.45
Intimate workers’ identities can be powerful signals. The intimate
worker is in many ways inseparable from her product: the intimate

happens when you let your guard down. When you open up to new adventures. Or, as
everyone and their mother says: Finding “the one” happens when you’re not even
looking for it. So maybe we shouldn’t be surprised to discover an overwhelming
number of couples who met and fell in love through the serendipitous circumstance of
an Airbnb. But we still are. Every time. From strangers to soul mates, we’re celebrating
Valentine’s Day with the stories of couples who met through one fateful stay in an
Airbnb. This is one of them.”); Anh-Minh Le, “When Strangers Meet” Film Contest
Winners, AIRBNB BLOG (Jan 27, 2015), http://blog.airbnb.com/when-strangers-meetfilm-contest-winners/ [https://perma.cc/VJ6A-F9JY] (sponsoring film contest about
strangers meeting on AirBnB).
44. Greg Muender, Uber vs. Lyft: A former driver compares the two services,
PANDO.COM (Dec. 3, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/12/03/uber-vs-lyft-a-formerdriver-compares-the-two-services/ [https://perma.cc/7BHE-L4WE].
45. See, e.g., Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and
Employment Outcomes for Minority Workers, 113 Q.J. ECON. 835 (1998) (finding that the
racial composition of an establishment’s customers has sizable effects on the race of
who gets hired in jobs that involve direct contact with customer and hypothesizing
that this is due to customer preferences in relationships).
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services she provides.46 Thus, the worker’s identity characteristics
“serve as signifiers . . . that shape expectations about the service they
are to receive.”47 For example, the Filipina childcare worker, for
instance, is seen as caring, family-first, and docile.48 While the signal
may not be reliable, it provides an easy shortcut when information is
expensive and biases run deep.49
Consumers may then perceive identity to be quite relevant to the
provision of intimate services. Identity may be seen to confer
expertise: a woman may believe that a female gynecologist is better
able to understand her problems.50 Identity preferences may also
derive from a belief that the consumer will face less discrimination
from workers who share the consumer’s identity.51 For example, a
woman might believe that a female divorce lawyer would hold fewer
biases against her choices in seeking alimony and child support. The
sensitive circumstances of intimate services can also lead consumers to
be more comfortable with workers of a particular identity.52 Intimacy

46. See Robin Leidner, Emotional Labor in Service Work, 561 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 81, 83 (1999); Amy S. Wharton, The Sociology of Emotional Labor, 35 ANN. REV.
SOC. 147, 152 (2009).
47. Wharton, supra note 46, at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. See Cameron Lynne Macdonald & David Merrill, Intersectionality in the
Emotional Proletariat, SERVICE WORK: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 113, 121-22 (Marek
Korczynski & Cameron Lynne Macdonald eds., 2009) (explaining that “racial/ethnic
groups are preferred by parents [for caregivers] based on their presumed qualities
that are rooted in their ethnicity,” and quoting a childcare placement agency owner:
“people think that Filipinas are from a different planet where everybody cares about
children”).
49. For the seminal discussion on labor market signals, see Michael A. Spence, Job
Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 356-61 (1973), and for more general discussion on
signals, see George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
50. See Tamar Lewin, Women’s Health Is No Longer a Man’s World, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
7, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/us/women-s-health-is-no-longer-aman-s-world.html [https://perma.cc/Y9T4-8H3C] (discussing how women’s
preference for female gynecologist is partially rooted in the belief that they will
understand women’s health better because they are women).
51. This is at least part of the basis for same-race preferences in health care
providers. See Jennifer Malat & Mary Ann Hamilton, Preference for Same-Race Health
Care Providers and Perceptions of Interpersonal Discrimination in Health Care, 47 J.
HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 173 (2006); Frederick M. Chen et al., Patients’ Beliefs About
Racism, Preferences for Physician Race, and Satisfaction With Care, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED.
138 (2005) (analyzing surveys showing that minorities who perceive racism in the
healthcare system are more likely to prefer physicians of the same race).
52. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 50 (in context of gynecologists, noting that “many
women find it easier to talk to another woman when the subject is sexuality or
menopause or pregnancy”).
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also strengthens the motivation to discriminate in the other direction–
from sellers against buyers.53
In the sharing economy, the shift in focus from an impersonal
transaction with a firm to a personal interaction between individuals
makes the identity of both the buyer and the seller more salient.54
Photographs and even names can reveal identity traits like race and
sex.55 This personalization of the transaction not only enables
discrimination,56 but by focusing the basis of trust in the relationship
between seller and buyer, it heightens the salience of the identity of the
transacting parties, heightening the odds of discrimination.57 Indeed, it
is precisely “‘[t]he social nature of the sharing economy [that renders

53. In the traditional economy, the issue of discrimination against consumers has
focused on discrimination that arises out of religious and moral preferences of
workers, e.g., a wedding vendor who refuses service to gay couples. See, e.g.,
Washington
v.
Arlene’s
Flowers,
No.
13-2-00871-5,
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2015-02-18—
ord._denying_defs._msj_and_granting_pls._and_wa_states_msj.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LU8J-4LJA ] (upholding discrimination challenge to wedding
florist’s refusal to serve gay couple against First Amendment defenses); Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (upholding discrimination
challenge to wedding photographer’s refusal to serve gay couple against First
Amendment defenses); Michael Paulson & Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in Arizona
Cheers Bill Allowing Businesses to Refuse to Serve Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/us/religious-right-in-arizona-cheers-billallowing-businesses-to-refuse-to-serve-gays.html [https://perma.cc/62TZ-HW5S].
54. See Stacy Perman, Is Uber Dangerous for Women?, MARIE CLAIRE (May 20, 2015),
http://www.marieclaire.com/culture/news/a14480/uber-rides-dangerous-forwomen [https://perma.cc/64BD-WDSG ] (quoting David Plouffe, former Obama
campaign manager now serving as Uber’s senior vice president of public policy and
strategy: “[T]he relationship that is most important to an Uber rider is that
relationship with their Uber driver, and it’s one that they really cherish.”).
55. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991–92 (2004).
56. Edelman & Luca, supra note 31, at 9-11(documenting race discrimination
against sellers on AirBnB); Ian Ayres, Mahzarin R. Banaji, & Christine Jolls, Race Effects
on Ebay, 46 RAND J. ECON. 891 (2015) (documenting race discrimination against sellers
of baseball cards on Ebay by varying race of person holding the card). The ratings
system may be one mechanism by which discriminatory bias is manifested. See Greg
Harman, The sharing economy is not as open as you might think, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 12,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/nov/12/algorithmsrace-discrimination-uber-lyft-airbnb-peer [https://perma.cc/HX2P-YHT2]; Rogers,
supra note 7, at 95.
57. The New Sidecar Has Arrived, SIDECAR (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.side.cr/thenew-sidecar-has-arrived/ [https://perma.cc/YJ92-6S4Q] (“You can now differentiate
yourself by the picture of your car, your profile photo, or your amazing attitude and the
service you provide. Sidecar’s new “bumper sticker” gives you the ability to advertise
what’s great about your ride and increases your chance of getting chosen by riders.”)
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it] more vulnerable [to identity preferences] than the traditional
economy.’”58
Other circumstances related to the intimacy of sharing economy
transactions make identity preferences particularly likely to flourish
there. The privacy of sharing economy transactions means that these
transactions take place in contexts that lack structural features that
constrain discrimination. In the traditional economy, transactions are
more likely to be entered into in public in the presence of others,
rather than in front of a computer in the privacy of one’s own home, or
on one’s smartphone.59 The publicness of interacting in the traditional
economy means that buyers and sellers are more likely to be subject to
the pressures of social norms, including the norm of
nondiscrimination.60 Transacting online in the sharing economy, with
no one watching, makes it easier to act on discriminatory preferences,
without any sense of the constraint of being monitored.
Moreover,
in
the
traditional
economy,
institutional
antidiscrimination structures may bring benefits that trickle down
even to those who are not protected by antidiscrimination law. For
example, equal opportunity and sexual harassment trainings for
employees in a traditional firm may mean that supervisors and
coworkers are less likely to discriminate not only against employees
who are protected by antidiscrimination, but also against independent
contractors who work in the same place.61 In the workplace-less
sharing economy, such institutional structures are largely absent.
II. THE SALIENCE OF SEX IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
The last Part explained how the more intimate nature of sharing
economy transactions heightens the salience of identity in these
transactions. This Part focuses specifically on one feature of identity–
sex–and discusses how the sex of both buyer and seller plays a
substantial role in the sharing economy. This Part first describes how

58. Jenna Wortham, Ubering While Black, MEDIUM (Oct. 23, 2014),
https://medium.com/matter/ubering-while-black-146db581b9db
[https://perma.cc/64WE-4TEX] (quoting Michael Luca).
59. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 95.
60. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, ‘How’s My Driving?’ for Everyone (and Everything), 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1759-65 (2006) (discussing monitoring and norm compliance).
61. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005) (discussing the role that firms play in
enforcing employment discrimination law); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001)
(same); cf. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003)
(documenting firms’ rigorous enforcement of sexual harassment law).
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in these intimate settings, sex preferences flourish due to interests
related to privacy, comfort, enjoyment, sexuality, and security, which
are discussed in turn. This Part then discusses the way that these sex
preferences manifest in the sharing economy in the forms of
discrimination and segregation.
A.

Explanations
1.

Privacy

As for privacy interests, these relate to concerns of bodily intimacy,
whether through physical touching, visual display, or simply sensitive
information about the body. One common preference among female
customers is for female gynecologists.62 We can see a similar
preference being met by the market, which has produced all-female
gyms63 and weight-loss centers.64 Firms routinely ask customers
whether they have a sex preference for services ranging from massage
therapy65 to hair styling.66
A number of sharing-economy transactions raise these privacy
concerns. If an AirBnB guest is sharing a dwelling and especially a
bathroom with her host, privacy concerns might arise for both guest
and host. As the Ninth Circuit discussed in a case holding that the
roommate relationship was protected by the right to intimate
association, “[a]side from immediate family or a romantic partner, it’s

62. See Lewin, supra note 50 (documenting that women now comprise over
seventy percent of ob-gyn residents and attributing this to patient demand). In the
past fifteen years, the rising demand for female gynecologists and obstetricians has led
to a rise in all-female practices. See Kate Stone Lombardi, A Clinic Where All the Doctors
Are
Women,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
3,
2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/03/nyregion/in-business-a-clinic-where-all-thedoctors-are-women.html
[https://perma.cc/FG8M-PPJ6];
WOMEN
OB/GYN,
http://www.womenobgyn.com [https://perma.cc/T234-ZLA6] (giving the tagline
“Women, helping women” and describing “group of five female OB/GYN’s, and three
nurse practitioners,” with a photograph of only women providers).
63. EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying BFOQ for health club
instructors).
64. EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (denying BFOQ for
weight-loss center counselors).
65. See Erika Allen, The First Issue in Any Massage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/fashion/massages-first-issue-man-or-womantherapist.html [https://perma.cc/T234-ZLA6] (explaining that when a customer is
booking a massage, a spa’s first question is often, “Do you prefer a male or female
massage therapist?”).
66. See Select Service(s) And Employee(s), Bubbles Hair Salon, BUBBLES,
https://bubbles.mylocalsalon.com/onlinebooking/v7410/Steps/SelectServices.aspx
[https://perma.cc/YX6W-BLRW].
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hard to imagine a relationship more intimate than that between
roommates, who share living rooms, dining rooms, kitchens,
bathrooms, even bedrooms.”67 As the court explained: “The home is
the center of our private lives. Roommates note our comings and
goings, observe whom we bring back at night, hear what songs we sing
in the shower, see us in various stages of undress and learn intimate
details most of us prefer to keep private. Roommates also have access
to our physical belongings and to our person . . . . Taking on a
roommate means giving him full access to the space where we are
most vulnerable . . . .”68 The court specifically recognized how the
intimacy of a shared dwelling can generate sex preferences: “women
will often look for female roommates because of modesty . . . concerns.
As roommates often share bathrooms and common areas, a girl may
not want to walk around in her towel in front of a boy.”69
While home-sharing as offered by sharing-economy firms like
AirBnB is typically not as intimate as the roommate relationship
because it is short-term, it still raises many of the same concerns even
in the limited time period during which the dwelling is shared. Such
persons may have “unfettered access to the home,” which “implicates
significant privacy . . . considerations.”70 And such bodily privacy
concerns are not limited to home-sharing services in the sharing
economy. One female ride-sharing passenger shared a story of
changing her clothes in the backseat of her ride-share car, and noted
that she only felt comfortable doing so because the driver was a
woman.71
2.

Comfort/Pleasure

Beyond preferences based in bodily intimacy, sex preferences often
arise out of increased comfort with those of the same sex in
emotionally intimate settings. For example, studies have shown that
most women prefer female psychotherapists,72 and firms that provide

67. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d
1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. This short-term, iterative nature of home-sharing guests also distinguishes
them from roommates in that hosts will likely have many home-sharing guests, but few
roommates.
71. See Hu, supra note 29.
72. See, e.g., Cynthia F. Pikus & Christopher L. Heavey, Client Preferences for
Therapist Gender, 10 J. COLL. STUD. PSYCH. 35 (1996) (finding that women prefer women
therapists and that men express little preference); Bernadette M. Lauber & Jean
Drevenstedt, Older Adults’ Preferences For Age and Sex of a Therapist, 14 CLIN.
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services addressing emotionally intimate services—from divorce
lawyers73 to nannies74—advertise on the basis of sex. These sex
preferences in emotionally intimate contexts are not simply about
comfort, but about pleasure for those who prefer their transactions to
be more rather than less intimate in terms of sharing and personal
conversation. For those who have such preferences, transacting with a
person of the same sex can be seen to facilitate this intimacy. Women
often find it easier to discuss personal matters with other women,
particularly in the provision and consumption of intimate services.75
A driver for a taxi service aimed at women said that she preferred
driving women because “[m]en would tell her to drive faster, or talk
about sports,” whereas “[w]omen opened up about their lives.”76 She
explained: “I bet you, if it had been a man, they would have stayed
quiet.”77 We see these preferences exercised in the sharing economy,
too. Several ride-sharing firms advertise the ability to select women
drivers or an all-female driving experience as a way to enhance the
comfort and enjoyment of the trip.78
GERONTOLOGIST 13 (1994) (finding sex preferences for therapists). These sex
preferences based on emotional intimacy can be seen in case law. Healey v.
Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) (accepting BFOQ in part
based in theory that female counselors could better serve girls with emotional
troubles).
73. THE
WOMEN’S
LAW
GROUP,
http://thewomenslawgroup.com
[https://perma.cc/KSR7-ZDQ3] (describing a practice of “female attorneys
who . . . practice law from a woman’s perspective,” and who “understand that going
through a divorce, custody issue, or other family law matter can be one of the most
difficult
times
of
your
life”);
WOMEN’S
DIVORCE
RIGHTS,
http://www.womensdivorcerights.com/about.php
[https://perma.cc/2C9B-3QTA]
(“[f]ounded . . . to support, inspire, and encourage women . . . during each stage of their
lives”).
74. See,
e.g.,
RENT
A
MOM
INC.,
http://www.rentamominc.com
[https://perma.cc/BDV7-3AYF] (“The Company with a Heart for Families”); RENT A
GRANDMA, http://rentagrandma.com [https://perma.cc/8HSD-VDJK].
75. See Pikus & Heavey, supra note 72, at 35 (women prefer female therapists);
Lauber & Drevenstedt, supra note 72; Debra L. Roter et al., Physician Gender Effects in
Medical Communication: A Meta-analytic Review, 288 PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP
756, 759 (2002) (both men and women prefer female primary care physicians due to
communication styles); see Klea D. Bertakis et al., Patient-Centered Communication in
Primary Care: Physician and Patient Gender and Gender Concordance, 18 J. WOMEN’S
HEALTH 4, 542-43 (2009) (intersection of female doctor with female patient results in
more interactive conversations focused on patient’s illness, experience, and personal
factors); Debra Roter et al., Effects of Obstetrician Gender on Communication and
Patient Satisfaction, 93 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 5, 5-6 (1999) (women have a strong
preference for female doctors in obstetrics and gynecology).
76. See Hu supra note 29.
77. Id.
78. Hiawatha Bray, Hitchhiking goes digital with Tripda ride sharing service, BOSTON
GLOBE
(Nov.
21,
2014),
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Comfort may also generate sex-based preferences that are
consistent with stereotypical male and female roles. The placement of
many of these services in the home triggers the traditional family roles
of men and women even more strongly than when workers act in the
market. So when selecting “taskers” for assistance with household
chores through a sharing economy firm like TaskRabbit, consumers
may feel more comfortable with those that fill stereotypical gender
roles: female taskers for cleaning and caring for children, and male
taskers for home repairs or to help us move furniture.79
3.

Sex

Sex is a motivation for gender preferences in intimate spaces. When
women want to keep sexuality out of an intimate space, they may seek
to do so by preserving an all-female space.80 Heteronormative
assumptions of course underlie this strategy: that concerns about sex
and sexual arousal raised by intimacy can be quelled by providing
these services in a same-sex space.81 Civil and criminal law once did

https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/21/hitchhiking-goes-digital-withtripda-ride-sharing-service/4JjciQxKybC2FD7HymwxUK/story.html
[https://perma.cc/UE9E-ANXQ] (“Tripda also features a ladies-only option for women
who would rather not take a long trip in the company of a male stranger”); Jay Barman,
Sidecar Now Let’s You Choose Women Drivers, SFIST (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://sfist.com/2014/12/19/sidecar_now_lets_you_choose_women_d.php
[https://perma.cc/64SM-RG8M].
The heightened intimacy of the sharing economy may increase demands for emotional
labor, which may disproportionately burden women. Arlie Hochschild identified
emotional labor as a problem in the traditional workplace. See ARLIE RUSSELL
HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING 7 (2d ed. 2003)
(providing the seminal study on invisible emotional labor—work we do to create a
particular feeling or state of mind in others—and documenting a variety of resulting
harms); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1307 (2000) (explaining how invisible work is not rewarded formally or informally).
Emotional labor is likely to be even more of a problem in the sharing economy, because
there is more direct interaction between buyers and sellers, and ratings-based
evaluations mean that sellers need to please buyers, and buyers need to please sellers.
This may have a disparate impact on women, because women are judged less favorably
than men when they provide support, and more harshly than men when they decline
to provide it. See Madeline E. Heilman & Julie J. Chen, Same Behavior, Different
Consequences: Reactions to Men’s and Women’s Altruistic Citizenship Behavior, 90 J. APP.
PSYCH. 431, 434-40 (2005).
79. See TASKRABBIT, supra note 37. See infra Part I.B for further discussion of how
sharing economy firms themselves reinforce these preferences.
80. See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC,
666 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a woman might prefer a female
roommate because “[s]he might also worry about unwanted sexual advances or
becoming romantically involved with someone she must count on to pay the rent.”)
81. Id.
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enforce a norm of no-sex between members of the same sex,
constructing same-sex spaces as sex-free zones.82 Although recent
changes in law undermine these heteronormative assumptions, the
strategy persists.83 Given the intimacy of the shared spaces of the
sharing economy, both buyers and sellers of ride-sharing and homesharing services have expressed preferences for all-female spaces to
avoid the injection of sexuality there.84
Men too have gender preferences that are rooted in sex and
sexuality. Men may prefer female service providers in intimate spaces
as a way to avoid connotations of homosexuality, as in the case of
men’s preference for female massage therapists,85 or as a way to inject
sexuality into the transaction, as in the case of restaurants like
Hooter’s.86 One concern with allowing ride-sharing passengers to
select the sex of their drivers is precisely that men would select women
drivers to engage in a sexually charged transaction.87 In fact, Uber has
relied on this preference as a marketing device. In 2014, it offered a
promotion in France for rides with “Avions de Chasse” (“hot chick”
drivers) with the tagline, “Who said women don’t know how to
drive?”88

82. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
83. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. —-, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (finding
constitutional right to same-sex marriage); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79
(2003) (holding anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional).
84. See Winnie Hu, New Service Offers Taxis Exclusively for Women, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/nyregion/new-service-offers-taxisexclusively-for-women.html [https://perma.cc/5PWJ-A4NR] (a driver for a femaleonly service described the service as akin to the a female-only gym she joined after she
“tired of men flirting with her while she was working out”).
85. See Allen, supra note 65.
86. A final reason for some sex preferences is religion. For example, Hasidic Jewish
women will only ride with women drivers. See Hu, New Service Offers Taxis Exlusively
for women, supra note 84.
87. See Barman, supra note 78 (“The only downside now, though, comes for female
Sidecar drivers, who say they could face further harassment from male passengers
who select them on purpose (and, we would guess, when drunk?). Because, yes, the
gender preference is available to all users, male and female.”).
88. Rebecca Greenfield, Want More Female Uber Drivers? Here’s How to Make It
Happen, FAST COMPANY, http://www.fastcompany.com/3043622/most-innovativecompanies/want-more-female-uber-drivers-heres-how-to-make-it-happen
[https://perma.cc/296J-D3GA]; Schuyler Velasco, Can Uber Solve its women problem,
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2015/0310/Can-Ubersolve-its-women-problem [https://perma.cc/JGS4-ZCQ2].
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Safety

Many sharing economy services, precisely because of the intimate
nature of where they occur—in a private home or vehicle—raise safety
concerns. Because these transactions occur in a private home or
vehicle, usually with no one else present besides the buyer and seller,
they render both the buyer and the seller vulnerable to physical and
sexual security risks. And the close private quarters in which these
transactions take place makes it difficult or impossible for a buyer or
seller who feels threatened to walk away or otherwise exit.
Safety concerns have been raised frequently in the context of ridesharing services, and affect both passengers and drivers.89 As for
passengers, ride-sharing services have faced a slew of assault
allegations against their drivers.90 Uber, for example, has faced
numerous complaints of sexual assault by its drivers in Boston,
Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington, D.C.,
and other cities.91 In December 2014, an Uber driver in New Delhi was
89. See Reported List of Incidents Involving Uber & Lyft, WHO’S DRIVING YOU?,
http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents [https://perma.cc/NB8B-Q3F4].
90. Perman, supra note 54.
91. Id. (describing among other incidents one where an Uber driver in Houston was
charged with sexually assaulting an intoxicated woman he’d pick up from a bar and
driven back to his home); Velasco, supra note 88; see also Steve Annear, et al., Uber
Driver
Charged
with
Assault,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(Feb.
9,
2015),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/02/09/boston-uber-driver-charged-withindecent-assault-and-battery-boston-policesay/k9eKsX2q95hA9bdM13IorJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/EDL4-2MX8] (reporting
multiple incidents of sexual assaults by Uber drivers against female passengers,
including a rape and several indecent assaults); Sarah Gray, Updated: Uber calls what
amounts to a 2-hour kidnapping an “inefficient route”, SALON (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://www.salon.com/2014/10/14/uber_calls_what_amounts_to_a_2_hour_kidnappi
ng_an_inefficient_route/ [https://perma.cc/9V2N-352W]; Perry Stein, Uber Driver
Charged With Sexually Assaulting Passenger in D.C., WASHINGTON CITY PAPER (July 28,
2014),
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk/2014/07/28/uberdriver-charged-with-sexually-assaulting-passenger-in-d-c/ [https://perma.cc/VRR2UFVU] (reporting on affidavit of passenger accusing Uber driver of molesting her after
she passed out in his car).
Uber has other “women problem[s].” Greenfield, supra note 88; Velasco, supra note 88;
Anita Little, Five Reasons to Delete Your Uber App, MS. MAGAZING BLOG (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2014/11/20/5-reasons-to-delete-your-uber-app/
[https://perma.cc/X7QN-S57X]. At the corporate level, Uber is known for a “broculture.” Chloe Angyal, Uber’s Plan to Employ More Female Drivers Won’t Empower
Women,
THE
NEW
REPUBLIC
(Mar.
23,
2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/121348/ubers-plan-employ-women-drivers-awful
[https://perma.cc/6GJP-55TG]. In 2014, Uber CEO Kalanick provoked ire for calling
his company “Boob-er” in a GQ profile, referring to the role that Uber’s success has
played in boosting his sex appeal. Id. That same year, the company apologized for its
French promotion offering attractive women drivers. Id. As discussed below, Uber has
a lower proportion of female drivers than any of its major competitors, and few female
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charged with kidnapping and raping a passenger, prompting a
temporary ban in that city.92
Drivers too face safety concerns. While ride-sharing services
provide one safety advantage over traditional taxi driving—being
cashless—they still present dangers to drivers.93 Female drivers
report various forms of sexual harassment by riders, particularly by
intoxicated men, including being propositioned for sex, facing other
unwanted come-ons, and even physical fondling.94 Female drivers also
report non-sexual physical assaults.95 And female Uber drivers have
faced harassment from male passengers who have located them using
the service’s “Lost and Found” feature, which allows passengers to get
directly in touch with their drivers if they believe they have left behind
their belongings.96
Other sharing economy services also pose safety concerns. For
example, AirBnB hosts and guests face security risks. Guests have been
drugged, sexually assaulted, and held hostage by their hosts.97 Again,
in the context of roommates, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the safety
concerns of shared dwellings, explaining that “[w]e are at our most

executives. Id. (noting that women comprise 14% of Uber’s drivers as compared with
30% of Lyft’s drivers and 40% of Sidecar’s drivers, and that of Uber’s top fifty
employees, only six are women).
92. See Velasco, supra note 88.
93. See Greenfield, supra note 88.
94. Ellen Huet, Why Aren’t There More Female Uber and Lyft Drivers?, FORBES (Apr. 9,
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/04/09/female-uber-lyft-drivers
[https://perma.cc/D5K9-38XJ] (reporting among other incidents one in January 2015
in Atlanta when an intoxicated male passenger asked his female driver to take him to a
strip club, and if she wanted to “make some extra money” by “danc[ing] for him”; after
she refused, the passenger rubbed her thighs and breasts and tried to kiss her).
95. Id. (describing incident in Los Angeles where female driver alleged that two
male passengers hit her in the face with a thorny rose after she asked them not to slam
her car door).
96. See Johana Bhuiyan, Men Are Using Uber’s Lost-And-Found Feature To Harass
Female
Drivers,
BUZZFEED
(Feb.
10,
2015),
http://www.buzzfeed.com/johanabhuiyan/faced-with-harassment-female-uberdrivers-often-left-to-fend#.ojJ9JMAq3 [https://perma.cc/E985-PWD4] (reporting
incidents where male passengers have contacted female drivers using the feature and
even visited their homes by using a combination of this feature and Apple’s Find My
iPhone feature).
97. See, e.g., Scott Stump, Airbnb Horror Story Reveals Safety Issues For Lodging Site,
TODAY (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.today.com/money/airbnb-horror-story-revealssafety-issues-lodging-site-t39091 [https://perma.cc/5CJF-3EZS]; Marie Lisa Jose, First,
Listen to My Story of Being Drugged on an Airbnb Stay, Then Learn from It, MATADOR
(Aug. 13, 2013), http://matadornetwork.com/trips/drugged-and-terrified-an-airbnbbooking-gone-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/5DRA-765Q].
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vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our own
safety or the security of our belongings.”98
Both female service providers and female consumers in the sharing
economy have expressed preferences for transacting with women as a
way to mitigate these safety concerns.99 The market has followed.
Several ride-sharing firms market a feature that allows passengers to
select the sex of their driver as a safety measure.100 One of Uber’s
primary responses to the safety concerns has been to pledge to hire
more women drivers.101
B.

Manifestations

The features of the sharing economy and the sex preferences therein
discussed in the last subparts have made gender salient in the sharing
economy. One notable feature of the salience of sex in these settings is
that sex is salient not simply as a product of unconscious biases or
structural features of the market, which of late have been the dominant
explanations for continuing inequality in the market.102 Much of the

98. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d
1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012).
99. See Hu, supra note 84; see Barman, supra note 78.
100. 7 Ways to Ride Safe this Season, SIDE CAR BLOG (Dec. 16, 2014),
http://www.side.cr/seven-ways-to-ride-safe-this-season-with-sidecar/
[https://perma.cc/PM9X-B84L] (“Sidecar is here with some tips from our female
drivers on how to ride snug and safe during the most wonderful (and busiest!) time of
the year . . . Seven Ways to Ride Safe this Season (with Sidecar!) Be Choosy: If you
prefer to ride in a newer car or with a woman at the wheel, go ahead and choose!”);
Bray, supra 78.
101. Meet the Uber Team Driving Our Women Partner Program, UBER (July 27, 2015),
http://newsroom.uber.com/2015/07/meet-the-uber-team-driving-our-womenpartner-program/ [https://perma.cc/DF8J-ZEWF] (one million women drivers
globally by 2020); Jessica Goldstein, You Shouldn’t Have to Hire A Female Driver: Uber’s
Hiring
Pledge
Isn’t
Enough,
THINKPROGRESS
(Mar.
12,
2015),
http://thinkprogress.org/culture/2015/03/12/3633002/shouldnt-female-driverubers-hiring-pledge-isnt-enough/ [https://perma.cc/J96U-BDGT]. In March 2015,
Uber announced a partnership with UN Women in its goal to create a million new
driving jobs for women by 2020. Angyal, supra note 91. After barely a week,
responding to criticism from women’s rights and labor groups, UN Women called off
the partnership. Id.
102. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role
of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1895–
96 (2009); Peggy C. Davis, Law of Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1561-62 (1989);
Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186–1217
(1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 317 (1987); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional
Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717,
1808 (2000); Ann C. McGinley, Viva Law Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in
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sex discrimination and segregation that we see in the sharing economy
is based in express discriminatory preferences and even outright
segregation.103 This Subpart will discuss the manifestations of sexbased preferences in the sharing economy.
As referenced above, one response to sex preferences has been
discrimination in the selection of both sellers and buyers.104 Some
ride-sharing companies have allowed riders to select a driver of his or
her preferred sex.105 One long-distance ride-sharing service, Trypda,
also allows drivers to choose only female passengers.106 These options
apparently have been quite popular. After Sidecar introduced this
option, many of their female drivers reported an increase in ride
Title VII, 9 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POLY’Y 415, 421–46 (2000); David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 902-15 (1993); Barbara
F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319,
321-23 (2000); Sturm, supra note 61, at 460 (2001). For a critique of this scholarly
trend, see generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006).
Note that we do also need to be concerned about how both conscious and unconscious
biases operate in the sharing economy. Such biases can work their way into both
buyers’ and sellers’ profiles by way of ratings. Abraham Riesman, We Asked 10 BlackCar Drivers If They Prefer Working for Lyft or Uber—Here’s Why Lyft Won By a
Landslide,
N.Y.
MAG.
(Dec.
7,
2014),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/12/lyft-uber-drivers.html#
[https://perma.cc/B9BD-FBJU] (“Nine out of ten times, it’s the foreigners that aren’t
good at speaking English that frustrate a customer. If they’re trying to get somewhere
and the language is a barrier, it’s difficult. They don’t mean to give the driver a bad
[average] rating. But based on communication skills, they’re giving you the rating on
that.”). These ratings are used not only by buyers and sellers to determine with whom
to transact, but also by sharing economy firms. For example, Uber will drop drivers if
their rating gets too low, see id., and Lyft won’t match a driver with a rider again if
either party rated the other party fewer than four stars, see Harry Campbell, My Rating
System for Uber and Lyft Passengers, THE RIDESHARE GUY (Aug. 31, 2015),
http://therideshareguy.com/my-rating-system-for-uber-and-lyft-passengers
[https://perma.cc/GM7Q-ZH5F].
103. This may flow from the fact that the norms against the expression of sex

preferences in intimate spaces are far weaker than the norms against, say, race
discrimination, as we can see in the ongoing sex segregation of certain intimate
spaces, including bathrooms and locker rooms. See Mary Anne Case, All the World’s

the Men’s Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655, 1656 (2007) (mentioning her work on “public
toilets as gendered spaces”); Mary Anne Case, Toilet Survey, http://webcastlaw.uchicago.edu/toiletsurvey/form/ [https://perma.cc/VXZ6-54Q3] (seeking to
gather data on sex-segregated toilet facilities); Mary Anne Case, Changing Room? A
Quick Tour of Men’s and Women’s Rooms in U.S. Law over the Last Decade, from the U.S.
Constitution to Local Ordinances, 13 PUBLIC CULTURE 333 (2001) [hereinafter Case,
Changing Room?] (documenting sex segregation of public toilets); Danielle A. Schmidt,
Bathroom Bias: Making the Case for Trans Rights under Disability Law, 20 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 155, 161 (2013) (discussing bathroom segregation in the workplace).
104. See supra Part I.B.
105. SIDE CAR BLOG, supra note 100; Bray, supra 78.
106. Bray, supra 78.
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requests from female passengers.107 And other sharing economy
services that allow consumers to select workers based on a profile
complete with name and photograph, such home-sharing services like
AirBnB and in-home task services like TaskRabbit, permit easy
discrimination on the basis of sex.
Sex segregation is another manifestation of the salience of sex in the
sharing economy. Lyft for example began as a ride-sharing service for
women only.108 While Lyft ultimately decided to provide service to
both men and women, recent taxi services like SheTaxis, which
provides an all-female taxi service by connecting female drivers with
female passengers, suggests that a sharing economy version is not far
behind.109 The sharing economy is also marked by significant informal
segregation by sex. Sex segregation is particularly marked among
drivers for ride-sharing services. Women constitute 14% of Uber’s
drivers, 30% of Lyft’s drivers, and 40% of Sidecar’s drivers.110 So
while Uber claims to be a job creator, it has been a job creator almost
entirely for men.111
Safety concerns contribute to the segregation of ride-sharing
services not only because women avoid driving due to these concerns,
but also because these concerns—and women’s attempt to address
them—end up making driving less lucrative for women.
A
combination of market forces and firm policies mean that female

107. Bhuiyan, supra note 96; Kaleigh Rogers, Why Doesn’t Uber Let Women
Passengers
Choose
Women
Drivers,
MOTHERBOARD
(Apr.
6,
2015),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-doesnt-uber-let-women-passengers-choosewomen-drivers [https://perma.cc/HS2B-MS9E].
108. Huet, supra note 94; see Rogers, Why Doesn’t Uber Let Women Passengers
Choose Women Drivers, supra note 107.
109. SHETAXIS, http://shetaxis.com [https://perma.cc/8QZV-YAEG]. SheTaxis is a
livery service that does not employ drivers directly, but joins with existing livery
companies that employ drivers to provide their female drivers to female passengers
seeking female drivers. See Hu, supra note 84. According to SheTaxis, anyone can use
the company’s services, but only a party including a woman can request a female
driver; a male passenger could be served by a driver of either sex. Because SheTaxis
does not employ its drivers, the company avoid the confines of employment
discrimination law. Under some cities’ laws, it would be illegal for a driver to decline a
fare because of gender. See id.
110. Angyal, supra note 91; Rogers, Why Doesn’t Uber Let Women Passengers Choose
Women Drivers, supra note 107. Note that at least some of these firms are doing
considerably better than taxi and livery drivers as a whole. Women make up only 14%
of all such drivers in the United States. Paul Merrion, Making Inroads: Women Cabbies
on
the
Rise,
CHICAGO
BUSINESS
(Sept.
27,
2014),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140927/ISSUE01/309279976/makinginroads-women-cabbies-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/TTV3-M792].
111. Huet, supra note 94.
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drivers suffer financially when they try to mitigate safety concerns.112
The busiest times of the week for ride-sharing are nights and
weekends, when drivers can make more money, both because of traffic
and because of bonuses offered by ride-sharing firms at these times.113
But these are also the times when riders are most likely to be
intoxicated. Female drivers who opt not to drive during these times
due to heightened safety concerns thus suffer disproportionate
financial consequences.
And female drivers who reject male
passengers who are intoxicated or otherwise pose safety risks likewise
suffer disproportionate losses. Some ride-sharing services require a
90% acceptance rate of riders to be eligible for bonuses, and other
services count cancellations against drivers in their ratings.114 Uber
does not let a driver block a certain passenger and Lyft only declines to
match a driver or passenger if either has given the other a sufficiently
low rating.115 Neither firm routinely removes passengers with low
ratings, though if drivers’ ratings fall, they are let go.116
There is one market for ride-sharing services that is overwhelmingly
female: driving children.117 Shuddle, which is essentially Uber for
children, is comprised of 98% female drivers.118 There are a number
of reasons for the gender inversion. First, drivers must have caregiving
experience, which is more common among women.119 Second, the
circumstances of the driving—during the daytime, without any
intoxicated adults—alleviates many of the safety concerns for women
drivers, and may be less likely to conflict with their own caregiving

112. See Greenfield, supra note 88.
113. Huet, supra note 94.
114. Huet, supra note 94.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Another gig economy platform dominated by women is Etsy.
ETSY,
https://www.etsy.com/ [https://perma.cc/HT78-DNXZ]. As compared with the ridesharing services, Etsy, a micro-entrepreneur platform that allows sellers to peddle
their creative wares through the site, is comprised of 88% female sellers.
Interestingly, while Etsy sellers report higher levels of education than most Americans,
the average/median income for Etsy sellers is $44,9000, ten percent lower than the
national average/median. Although many Etsy sellers use the platform merely to
supplement more traditional income sources, it is notable that these sellers
nonetheless remain below average in income. See Jennifer Neeley, Is the Sharing
Economy
Feminist,
SOCIAL
MEDIA
TODAY
(June
2,
2015),
http://www.socialmediatoday.com/technology-data/jennifer-neeley/2015-0602/sharing-economy-feminist [https://perma.cc/THH2-GV5N].
118. Mike Isaac, New Ride Services Forge Own Specialized Paths, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June
10, 2015), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/new-ride-services-forge-ownspecialized-paths/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y4RQ-PQ5N].
119. Greenfield, supra note 88.
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obligations.120 Finally, stereotypical expectations of both workers and
consumers strongly type this sort of intimate caregiving service as
women’s work.121
III. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SEX EQUALITY
The merging of first, second, and third places, and the increasing
blurring of home and market that comes with the sharing economy
present challenges for legal regulation. As legal scholars have long
recognized (and critiqued), current law is organized largely around the
distinction between the family and market.122 Particularly when it
comes to discrimination, very different law applies to the home and the
market. In the home, sex discrimination has long not only been
permitted, but required.123 While required sex discrimination has
faded,124 discrimination is still permissible.125 On the other hand,
many forms of sex discrimination are prohibited in the labor
market,126 in the housing market,127 and in public accommodations.128
As set forth in the last two Parts, as the sharing economy expands,
the nature of the transactions and the context in which they occur
make it particularly likely that sex preferences, and discrimination on
the basis of such preferences, will flourish. There is perhaps an irony
here: as law has become less accepting of discrimination in the

120. Id.
121. See supra notes 45-53 (discussing how identity signals skills for certain work).
122. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 24, at 1498, 1501.
123. We can see this through anti-sodomy laws, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578–79 (2003) (striking down sodomy ban), and bans on gay marriage, see Obergefell
v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (striking down gay marriage ban).
124. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (striking down ban on gay marriage);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down anti-sodomy law).
125. No law bans private actors from discriminating in the selection of romantic
partners or children for adoption, and, indeed, the constitutional right to intimate
association guarantees some sphere of liberty for individuals to exercise
discriminatory preferences free from government interference in their most intimate
interactions. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the
Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009) (discrimination in romance);
Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 634 (1980)
(intimate association). The lack of legal prohibition even extends outside the family, to
certain domestic workers who labor in the home. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at
1231; Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 72–79 (1996).
While Section 1981 bans race discrimination in contracting, other prohibitions against
discrimination do not apply against domestic workers. See id.
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
127. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1968).
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
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home,129 the changing shape of the economy is leading to more
discrimination in the market. The sharing economy thus may be seen
to pose a threat to the sex equality project of the market, that is, the
goal of ridding market transactions of the salience of sex by eliminating
sex discrimination, sex segregation, and sex stereotyping.130 Before
going further, it is worth acknowledging that the sex equality project is
not monolithic.
There are exceptions to the ban on sex
discrimination,131 as well as certain contexts in which sex
discrimination law allows for the recognition of sex differences in the
market.132 And of course not everyone agrees that sex equality is best
achieved by making sex less rather than more salient in the market.133
Despite these facets of sex discrimination law, it is nonetheless
descriptively accurate to recognize that existing sex discrimination law
primarily aims to make sex less salient in the market.
This Part first discusses the threat that the sharing economy poses
to the legal sex equality project, and also considers whether the
sharing economy poses any promise or reason for reconsidering the
equality project. This Part next discusses what role there is for law to
intervene. It addresses the unsettled nature of current law, market
responses in the face of this uncertainty, and the challenges that the
sharing economy poses for the sex equality project even if current
antidiscrimination law were to be extended to the sharing economy,
which calls into question the transformative potential of
antidiscrimination law there.
A.

Promise or Threat?

As we can see, sex preferences have flourished in the sharing
economy. Importantly, these preferences manifest not only in subtle

129. See sources cited supra note 126.
130. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 996; Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle
in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 106–108 (2010).
131. I discuss the intimacy-based exceptions in infra Part III.B.3. For an interesting
critique of how antidiscrimination law, through its exceptions, operates both to
prohibit and to approve certain forms of sex discrimination, see Robert Post,
Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1
(2000).
132. See Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) (holding
that Title VII does not preempt a state law that mandates benefits for pregnant
workers and not for non-pregnant workers because “Congress intended the
[Pregnancy Discrimination Act] to be a floor beneath which pregnancy disability
benefits may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise”).
133. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 996 (discussing disagreement among feminists as
to whether sex equality is best achieved by the law recognizing sex differences when it
comes to pregnancy).
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discrimination and unconscious biases, but overt discrimination and
segregation. This suggests not only that norms are not strong enough
to constrain sex discrimination in these settings, but that norms are
sufficiently weak that express sex preferences and even segregation
are considered acceptable and perhaps even desirable (at least by
substantial numbers of persons).
Some might argue that the sharing economy holds promise in terms
of rethinking the sex equality project. As an initial matter, the sharing
economy may lead us to question the boundaries around the home and
the market as they traditionally have been conceived. This holds the
promise of breaking down these boundaries that feminist legal
scholars have typically found troubling, as these boundaries have often
been used to deny protection to women and women’s work.134
However, most feminist scholars have been concerned not simply with
shifting the boundaries, but with extending the protections of the
public sphere to the private sphere.135 If the sharing economy prompts
recognition of the need to extend more market protections to the
home, this would be consistent with the arguments of many sex
equality scholars.136
If, instead, the sharing economy extends
exceptions to antidiscrimination protections for market activity
because they are viewed as sufficiently private or intimate, this would
present a challenge to the sex equality project as it has primarily been
conceived.
This challenge might be supported with a range of arguments. First,
what we already see happening in the sharing economy strongly
suggests that some people—especially women—want the freedom to
exercise sex preferences. Despite the sex equality project, there is still
a strong sense that sex preferences in intimate spaces within the
market, housing, and public accommodations are acceptable—we can
see this both in life137 and in law.138 Eliminating these options then
134. See Olsen, supra note 24, at 1518–20; Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1174–75;
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love, supra note 125, at 22–26.
135. See sources cited id.
136. See sources cited supra note 136.
137. See Case, Changing Room?, supra note 103 (bathrooms); Lewin, supra note 50;
Allen, supra note 65 (massage); Barry Gewen, Sports and Sexual Segregation, N.Y. TIMES
BLOG (June 4, 2008), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/sports-andsexual-segregation/?_r=0l [https://perma.cc/8QS7-X9TJ] (athletics).
138. Title VII’s BFOQ exception applies to sex but not race. See infra, notes 204-10
and accompanying text for more on the BFOQ exception. Section 1981 bans race but
not sex discrimination in contracting. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991). And of course strict
scrutiny applies to race discrimination under the Constitution, while only intermediate
scrutiny applies to sex. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 494
(1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to race classifications),
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may actually reduce women’s welfare. And there may be trade-offs
between intimacy and equality. As one driver explained, she preferred
working for an all-female taxi service because she was able to engage
in more intimate transactions with female passengers.139 Second, an
alternative regime might be justified if the circumstances of certain
market transactions are sufficiently different that they justify a
different approach to legal regulation. In fact, there might be concern
that if we regulate sharing economy activities too much like those of
the traditional economy that the law will infringe too much on spaces
where we currently enjoy freedom from regulation.140 Finally, one
might argue that allowing alternative regulatory regimes to exist in the
market would provide the benefit of affording buyers and sellers the
opportunity to opt into the regulatory regime that best matched their
own preference.141
We have rejected each of these arguments in the traditional
economy.142 Is there a reason to accept them in the sharing economy?
Believers in the sex equality project would argue no.143 While a lack of
with Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to sex classifications).
139. See Hu, supra note 84.
140. I am not arguing specifically that a constitutional right to intimate association
applies in these cases, but rather that as a matter of practice these spaces are currently
subject to less regulation.
141. See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Refultaion and Innovation in the
Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116 (2015),
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/self-regulation-and-innovation-peer-peersharing-economy [https://perma.cc/643J-7RAG] (arguing for different regulatory
regimes for the sharing and traditional economies). But see Edith Ramirez, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Keynote Remarks at the 42nd Annual Conference on International Antitrust
Law
and
Policy,
Fordham
Law
School
(Oct.
2,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/810851/151002for
dhamremarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/S87N-M9TX] (arguing to “avoid creating two
distinct regulatory tracks—with one set of rules for the older, incumbents businesses
and a different set of rules for the new entrants they now increasingly compete
against”).
142. With the exception of the intimacy exceptions discussed infra Part III.B.3,
which, at least in the traditional economy, have been recognized as quite narrow and
have been applied only rarely. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2002) (“The [Equal
Employment Opportunity] Commission believes that the bona fide occupational
qualification exception as to sex [discrimination] should be interpreted narrowly. “).
By contrast, recognizing a similar approach in the sharing economy would so greatly
expand the recognition of such exceptions such that the difference would be one in
kind, not just degree.
143. Scholars have addressed these arguments in the context of other intimate work
situations and have made a persuasive case rejecting them. See Amy Kapczynski,
Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1259
(2003) (arguing that there is no justification for the privacy-based BFOQ exception
grounded in customer sex preferences); Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and
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regulation would increase choice for some, it would decrease choice
for others. We can see this in the context of the traditional economy
when it comes to male gynecologists, where the preference for female
gynecologists has seriously hindered men’s ability to pursue this
career path.144 And of course, these sex preferences are grounded in
sex-based stereotypes. Allowing sex-based stereotypes to have a
strong hold in the market runs exactly contrary to the sex equality
project, which is premised significantly in an anti-stereotyping
principle—that is, that we should not classify on the basis of
assumptions about how a man or a woman will behave simply because
of sex.145
Under this anti-stereotyping approach, there may be some tension
between short-term and long-term utility. The anti-stereotyping
approach is premised in the notion that restricting reliance on sex will
make sex less salient over time, thereby reducing the need to rely on
sex in the future.146 And there is reason to believe that sex preferences
are not fixed but malleable. For example, while women currently
prefer female gynecologists, this preference arose only relatively
recently.147 Until just a few decades ago, when gynecology was a male
profession, women saw male gynecologists without complaint.148 This
shift in preference for female gynecologists was, of course, prompted
largely by Title VII’s equal employment opportunity mandate, which
opened up the medical profession to women.149 Thus, there is reason
to believe that consumer preferences can be responsive to the force of
law.
And there is yet another reason why law should not simply accede
to sex preferences in the name of worker and customer autonomy. Sex
Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing
Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 329-33 (1985) (questioning arguments supporting the
BFOQ grounded in customer sex preferences but stopping short of arguing for the
elimination of the BFOQ exception).
144. See Lewin, supra note 50 (discussing how women’s preference for female
gynecologists has limited men’s future in the field). The status of the BFOQ exception
as it applies to gynecologists is not clear. See Veleanu v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr., No. 98 Civ.
7455, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13948, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (holding that
satisfying patient’s request for female gynecologist does not constitute unlawful
discrimination without answering whether BFOQ applies such that the employer itself
would be barred from considering sex); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80–1374–
W, 1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (applying BFOQ to labor and delivery
nurse).
145. See Franklin, supra note 130, at 106.
146. Id. at 84-85.
147. See Lewin, supra note 50.
148. See id.
149. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1006–09.
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preferences cannot be viewed as entirely exogenous or fully formed
before workers and customers enter the market. 150 Rather, sharing
economy firms play a role in shaping preferences. Therefore, it is not
even clear whether satisfying these preferences can even be seen to
further the unmanipulated interests of workers and customers.
Some firms expressly suggest sex discrimination as a way to satisfy
preferences of privacy, comfort, and safety.151 Even when such firms
do not expressly advocate sex discrimination, they nonetheless may
reinforce conscious and unconscious discriminatory preferences.
TaskRabbit’s homepage, for example, suggests the different tasks for
which you can “Hire [a tasker] for a Range of Needs Around Your
Home.”152 For the task of “Cleaning” (“We’ll make your home
sparkle!”), we see an image of a (white) female tasker cleaning a
kitchen, with a woman (presumably the client) holding a baby in the
background (representing the female labor she is replacing).153 For
the task of “Moving Help,” we see an image of a (black) man moving
boxes.154 These images prime us for the identity of the proper tasker
for each task. For the task of “Handyman,” (“Taskers can help with
handyman tasks around your home.”), TaskRabbit goes further,
making it explicit that it is men who should complete these tasks.155 If
“Handyman” was not clear enough, we see an image of a (white) man
with his tools.156
As Professor Vicki Schultz has made clear in the case of employees,
individuals do not come to the workplace with fully formed
preferences about work.157 Rather, work experiences themselves,
which are largely determined by the employer, shape workers’
expectations and preferences.158 This is no less true for consumers,
whose expectations and preferences are not exclusively formed before

150. See Allen, supra note 65 (noting that one woman believed she had no
preference for either a male or female masseuse until realizing that with a female
masseuse she was able to relax more).
151. See supra Part II.B.
152. See TASKRABBIT, supra note 37.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of
Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1815 (1990) (“[W]omen’s work preferences
are formed, created, and recreated in response to changing work conditions”).
158. Id. at 1816 (describing the variety of mechanisms employers use to “structure
opportunities and incentives and maintain work cultures and relations so as to
disempower most women from aspiring to and succeeding in traditionally male jobs”).
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entering the market for a transaction. Rather, the market can help to
shape expectations and preferences for the provision of intimate
services.159 To the extent that firms cultivate and reinforce consumers’
discriminatory preferences, this helps to shape preferences by
legitimating rather than disrupting such preferences, particularly by
creating the environment in which intimate services are delivered.160
If consumers have their preferences accommodated, this reinforces
their preexisting view that this is the only acceptable way these
services may be delivered.161
Moreover, when it comes to safety, relying on sex preferences
sidesteps the underlying issue, which is a safety problem. The solution
then is not to avoid the safety issues with sex segregation (which puts
the burden on the potential victim of the danger), but to address the
underlying safety concerns (which puts the burden on those who pose
the safety risks and the institutions responsible for them).162 Relying
on sex segregation to address safety problems in ride-sharing services
is reminiscent of single-sex transit systems such as women-only buses
and subway cars in place in other countries, including Egypt, Iran, and
Pakistan.163 This approach is entirely out of step with the U.S. antistereotyping approach to sex discrimination.164
A final problem with sex-based classifications is that they assume a
neat binary when it comes to sex. In an era when Caitlyn Jenner is
gracing magazine covers and the public is increasingly coming to

159. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1193-96. Other scholars have recognized
the role of the law in shaping even our most intimate preferences. See Emens, supra
note 125, at 1366-74, for a discussion of the law’s role in structuring, as she terms it,
“the accidents of sex and love”—the likelihood of dating and marrying people from
particular identity groups.
160. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1193-96.
161. See id.
162. We can see this recognition by the dissent in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). There, the dissent recognized that the real
problem in the prison was its “barbaric and inhumane” conditions—”conditions so bad
that state official have conceded they violate the Constitution.” Id. at 342. The
response should have been to improve these conditions rather than to ban women
from working in them.
163. See Angyal, supra note 91; Holly Kearl, Actually, No: Women-Only
Transportation
Won’t
End
Harassment,
TAKEPART,
http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/08/31/women-only-public-transportation
[https://perma.cc/R3XN-8YT7](noting that countries with women-only bus services
include Bangladesh, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, and the
United Arab Emirates, and that countries with women-only subway cars or sections of
trains include Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, and Russia).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 125-30.
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accept transgenderism165, this is an especially problematic solution.
Transgender individuals have already troubled our sex-segregated
spaces, such as bathrooms and athletic facilities.166 A regime premised
on sex is likely to raise significant classification problems for
transgender individuals and concerns about who is a “real” woman.167
And substantial reliance on sex-based classifications might pose a
challenge to transgenderism, which relies on some notion of fluidity
across the sexes.168
Finally, believers in the sex equality project might be concerned that
the sheer size of the sharing economy poses too great of a threat to the
sex equality project were it to go unregulated by antidiscrimination
law. If antidiscrimination law does not apply to the bulk of sharing
economy transactions, this creates a large and expanding segment of
market activity that is not subject to the equality norms that typically
govern work, housing, and much activity in third spaces. This would
affect not only the sharing economy, but could, by affecting the norms
of sex equality in the market, undermine the role of antidiscrimination
law in transforming gender relations even within the traditional
economy.
B.

What Role for Law?

This Subpart addresses what role the law can play in addressing the
salience of sex in the sharing economy. It is not clear whether current
165. See Buzz Bissinger, Caitlyn Jenner: The Full Story, VANITY FAIR (July 2015),
http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/06/caitlyn-jenner-bruce-cover-annieleibovitz [https://perma.cc/5FYH-BMW2] (cover photo of Jenner done by Annie
Leibowitz).
166. See Schmidt, supra note 103, at 161-62. For a fascinating discussion of these
issues, see Michelle Goldberg, What Is a Woman?, NEW YORKER (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2
[https://perma.cc/5QNC-ZUCR].
167. Goldberg, supra note 166.
168. One could argue that transgenderism actually accepts and reinforces the sex
binary. It is premised on the notion that there are two sexes and that a person
identifies as either one or the other. If someone identifies with the sex not of her birth,
she may need to switch sex. There are other sex and gender identity positions that
blur the line far more, such as persons who refuse to identify as either male or female,
or even persons who feel no compunction to have their gender performance match
their sex. See generally Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation,
supra note 5 (1995) (discussing the distinction between sex and gender, and the legal
implications for those whose gender does not match their sex); Elinor Burkett, What
Makes
a
Woman?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
7,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/sunday/what-makes-awoman.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5QNC-ZUCR] (highlighting and critiquing that
transgender individuals often adopt very stereotypical performances of female
gender).
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antidiscrimination and other protective law applies to the sharing
economy. This Subpart does not seek to answer this question,169 but
briefly sets forth the terms of the uncertainty. The primary aim of this
Subpart is to highlight how even if this law does apply, there are
reasons to believe that it will not be as effective or transformative as it
has been in the traditional economy. The sharing economy thus poses
unique challenges for the goals of sex equality. This Subpart begins
with a discussion of current law and market responses, then turns to
the challenges that the sharing economy presents to antidiscrimination
law, and concludes with a few suggestions for new legal approaches to
address these challenges.
1.

Current Law

The first set of laws that would be relevant to discrimination in the
sharing economy is antidiscrimination law in the employment,
housing, and public accommodations contexts. These laws ban sex
discrimination.170 But it is not clear whether these laws apply to
sharing economy firms.171 As for employment discrimination law,
many sharing economy firms have argued that their workers are
independent contractors and not employees, and thus that they are not
covered under these laws.172 Litigation is ongoing,173 and scholars
have disagreed on the correct answer.174

169. Other scholars have taken on this task. See, e.g., Benjamin Means & Joseph
Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 4 (forthcoming 2016),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663350
[https://perma.cc/V88C-9JWY]; Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, supra note 7, at 95.
170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964) (federal employment discrimination law), et. seq.;
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1968) (federal housing discrimination law); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
(1964) (federal public accommodations law). Federal public accommodations law
does not bar sex discrimination, but most state laws do. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. §
18.80.200 (West 1964); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1442 (West 1965); 2015 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 282 (S.B. 600) (2015); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-34-601 (West 1979); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-64 (West 1949).
171. See Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, supra note 7, at 95.
172. See Means & Seiner, supra note 169, at 2–3; Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber,
supra note 7, at 98-99. Note that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which bans race discrimination in
contracting, should operate to prohibit race discrimination, regardless of worker
status.
173. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. C-13-03826 EMC (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 11, 2015); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065-VC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015).
174. Compare, e.g., Rogers, supra note 7, at 98–99 (questioning whether current law
would consider sharing economy firms to be employers, but arguing that the law
should so cover them), with Means & Seiner, supra note 169, at 4 (arguing that current
law is too uncertain to answer the question and arguing for a new standard based on
worker flexibility).
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As for the application of housing discrimination law and public
accommodations law, sharing economy firms have likewise claimed
that these laws do not apply to them because they are not entities that
are regulated under the law.175 Their status under current law is not
clear.176 Even if these laws do not cover firms, there is a separate
question of whether individuals who open their homes or cars or other
spaces to customers are covered. But even if individuals are covered,
this would have less of an impact than regulating the firms themselves,
as firms rather than individuals are the entities with the incentives and
the ability to implement effective policies to address the concerns
raised above.177
The second set of laws that would be relevant here is law related to
safety. For safety issues that rise to a serious enough level, criminal
law could deter and punish, and tort law could deter and compensate.
But because the institutional entity—the firm—rather than the
individual has a much greater ability to control and prevent harms and
to compensate victims, effective use of these areas of law would turn
on institutional liability.178 Sharing economy firms themselves might
be negligent with regard to allowing unsafe users to use their services,
but likely only if they knew or should have known of the dangers.179

175. See
ADA
and
FHA
Compliance,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/898/ada-and-fha-compliance
[https://perma.cc/Y9LZ-ZGAE] (discussing that it is important for U.S. hosts (and not
Airbnb) to understand their responsibilities under the Fair Housing Act).
176. See Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, supra note 7, at 95. Compare 42 USC §
2000a(b) (1964) (defining “place of public accommodation” to include, for example,
hotels and motels, restaurants, and theaters, but not transportation companies), with
49 CFR § 37.29 (1991) (“Providers of taxi service are subject to the requirements of
[the transportation and related provisions of Titles II and III of the ADA].”); DC Code §
2-1401.02(24) (1977) (defining “place of public accommodation” to include “all public
conveyances”). Disability-rights organizations have argued that Uber is a taxi service
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and therefore must make
reasonable accommodations for disabled passengers. See Complaint for Violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the California Unruh Civil
Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 & 52, and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 54–54.3, National Federation of the Blind of California v. Uber Technologies,
Inc, Case No 3:14-cv-4086, 2014 WL 4628579, at *14–20 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2014). The
Justice Department has sided with the plaintiffs. Statement of Interest of the United
States of America, National Federation of the Blind of California v. Uber Technologies,
Inc, Case No 3:14-cv-4086, *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2014).
177. Individuals are far less likely to be sued, and thus they will not feel as much
pressure to comply with any applicable law. And they do not have the resources or the
control to ascertain and implement effective safety and antidiscrimination measures.
178. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Vicarious and Corporate Civil Liability, in TORT LAW AND
ECONOMICS 134, 134-36 (Michael Faure, Ed. 2009)
179. See Kat Greene, Airbnb Renter Says Hosts Were Spying With Hidden Camera,
LAW360 (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/737996/airbnb-renter-

38

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

For this reason, effective safety policies would be more likely to be
forthcoming from sharing economy firms if they faced vicarious
liability for the torts of their workers.180 Vicarious liability will turn on
whether these workers are in fact employees, which again is
contested.181
Finally, there are regulations aimed at protecting the safety of
workers and consumers.182 But again, sharing economy firms claim
that these laws do not apply to them because they are not the type of
entities that are covered by such laws.183 These issues have yet to be
resolved.184
2.

Market Responses

Whether due to market pressure or worker pressure,185 sharing
economy firms have responded to some discrimination and safety
concerns in ways that are not required by law. But the responses have
been inadequate. Some firms prohibit posting material that “promotes
discrimination, bigotry, racism, hatred, harassment or harm,” and will
engage in some monitoring to help enforce the policy.186 But firms do
says-hosts-were-spying-with-hidden-camera [https://perma.cc/Y4M2-XTPS] (arguing
that Airbnb doesn’t have a vetting process and bringing a negligence claim against
Airbnb).
180. See Talia G. Loucks, Travelers Beware: Tort Liability in the Sharing Economy, 10
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 329, 333 (2015); see also Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between:
Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2016), 8
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2535656
[https://perma.cc/CH84-ZMFZ].
181. See Id. at 335; see also Andrew Deck, Are Uber Drivers Employees? The Growing
Labor Crisis in the “Sharing Economy,” BROWN POLITICAL REVIEW (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/10/are-uber-drivers-employees-thegrowing-labor-crisis-in-the-sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/B57J-5TV9].
182. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78; National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197, 142(1).
183. See Stemler, supra note 180, at 9.
184. See sources cited supra note 175. In a decision that applies only to the
individual employee claimant, the California Labor Commissioner’s Office concluded
that an Uber driver was an employee, not an independent contractor. See Berwick v.
Uber
Techs.,
Inc.,
Case
No.
11-46739
EK
(June
3,
2015),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/268911290/Uber-vs-Berwick [https://perma.cc/2MJ8XATD]. Uber has appealed this decision. See Uber Techs. v. Berwick, Case No. CGC-15546378 (Cal. Sup. Ct. June 16, 2015), http://www.scribd.com/doc/268911290/Ubervs-Berwick [https://perma.cc/2MJ8-XATD].
185. See Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, supra note 7, at 96-97, 99 (citing
associations of Uber drivers and how work stoppage changed Uber behavior).
186. Harman, supra note 56. In one instance, AirBnB removed a listing that banned
gay couples. Nick Duffy, Accomodation website Airbnb removes listing that banned gay
couples,
PINKNEWS
(Nov.
23,
2014),
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2014/11/23/accomodation-website-airbnb-removes-
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not engage in nearly enough monitoring to ensure that users do not
discriminate, not only in the posting of material, but in the remainder
of their transactions.187 And of course at least some of these firms are
playing a role in cultivating discrimination, either specifically by
relying on sex discriminatory mechanisms, or by activating
discriminatory preferences.188
Sharing economy firms have taken action in response to safety
concerns, but these responses too have been inadequate. For example,
Uber and other ridesharing services vet their drivers by relying on
private firms that conduct criminal background checks.189 But the
firms have been criticized for incomplete background checks after
finding drivers with criminal histories.190 And this falls short of the
measures required in many cities to ensure the safety of taxi drivers:
finger-printing to check their status on federal databases of violent
offenders and drug-testing.191 Uber does not provide an emergency
number for passengers who feel threatened by drivers; the only way to
contact the firm is by email.192 Nor has the company removed from its
system passengers who have been reported to sexually harass
drivers.193 In December 2014, Uber updated its safety policy, and
began charging a safety surcharge to all rides.194 But assaults have
continued even after the revamp.195

listing-that-banned-gay-couples/ [https://perma.cc/QK4A-ZY68]. AirBnB just rolled

out new measures to combat discrimination, but it is too soon to assess their
efficacy. See Katie Benner, AirBnB Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination by Its
Hosts,
N.Y.
TIMES,
at
A1
(Sept.
9,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/technology/airbnb-anti-discrimination-rules.html

(reporting that the company would require rental hosts to agree to a “community
commitment” to comply with a new nondiscrimination policy and would try to
reduce reliance on user photographs).
187. Lyft doesn’t track users’ race or gender, but they monitor drivers to make sure
they aren’t denying a large number of requests to particular group. If so, this might
lead to investigation of driver. Harman, supra note 56; Wortham, supra note 58.
However, most firms do not engage in any sort of comprehensive monitoring and
auditing that could help to reduce discrimination.
188. See supra notes 104-121 and accompanying text.
189. See Perman, supra note 54.
190. See id.; Carmel DeAmicis, Exclusive: Uber driver accused of assault had done
prison time for a felony, passed background check anyways, PANDO (Jan. 6, 2014),
https://pando.com/2014/01/06/exclusive-uber-driver-accused-of-assault-passedzero-tolerance-background-check-despite-criminal-history/ [https://perma.cc/79B3MC23].
191. See Perman, supra note 54.
192. See id.
193. See Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, supra note 7.
194. Uber’s ‘safe ride fee’ becomes ‘booking fee’ after $25m settlement over rider
safety,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
7,
2016),
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AirBnB has tried to increase consumer and host protections by
doing more to verify the personal aspects of the transaction. The firm
has added protections to ensure that online profiles match real-life
identities.196
The “Verified ID” function matches users’ online
identities (for example, through existing AirBnB reviews or Facebook)
and offline documentation, such as scanning official identification, like
a driver’s license.197 But the scheme is not yet obligatory unless
booking last minute.198
Note that market pressures may push at least some firms towards
classifying their workers as employees and bringing them within the
dictates of employment law. While working with independent
contractors allows firms to avoid the minimum wage and other
expensive protections that come along with employment status, it
comes at a cost. The demise of at least one sharing economy firm,
Homejoy, a home cleaning service, has been attributed to the lack of
control they exercised over their workers, leading to inferior service
and dissatisfied customers.199 A few sharing economy firms have
voluntarily shifted their workers from independent contractors to
employees because they deemed control over their workers necessary
for the success of their business.200
While this voluntary
reclassification is not likely to be adopted by most firms, these
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/07/uber-driver-backgroundcheck-lawsuit-passenger-safety-california [https://perma.cc/8RUD-L6NX]; Perman,
supra note 54 (explaining that the fee goes toward background checks, vehicle
screenings, driver education, and the development of additional safety features).
195. See Velasco, supra note 88.
196. Paul Brady, Six Tips for First-Time Airbnb Renters, CONDE NAST TRAVELER (Jan. 14,
2014), http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2014-01-14/six-tips-for-first-time-airbnbrenters [https://perma.cc/5ZBH-WW3N]. See Strahilevitz, supra note 60, at 1705, on
how anonymity in the context of driving leads to worse behavior.
197. What is Verified ID?, UBER, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/450/what-isverified-id [https://perma.cc/5X7U-ENUS].
198. Airbnb Help, I’m a host. What are some safety tips I can follow?, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/231/i-m-a-host—what-are-some-safety-tips-ican-follow [https://perma.cc/3DXU-HGRB]; Airbnb Help, I’m a guest. What are some
safety tips I can follow?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/241/i-m-aguest—what-are-some-safety-tips-i-can-follow [https://perma.cc/9KQ6-FJG5].
199. See Ellen Huet, What Really Killed Homejoy? It Just Couldn’t Hold on to Its
Customers,
FORBES
(July
23,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/what-really-killed-homejoy-itcouldnt-hold-onto-its-customers [https://perma.cc/YWD7-7KKX].
200. See Ellen Huet, The Price Of Control: On-Demand Shipping Service Shyp Converts
Its
Couriers
To
Employees,
FORBES
(July
1,
2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/01/on-demand-shipping-serviceshyp-converts-its-couriers-to-employees/ [https://perma.cc/LGK7-XBZV]. On the
general question of the firm’s make/buy decision, see the seminal Ronald Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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examples reveal at least some counter-pressure from the market that
would limit independent contracting even in the sharing economy.
3.

Challenges for Law

Even if antidiscrimination law does apply to the sharing economy,
either under current doctrine or by expansion of the law to new types
of working relationships, such as “dependent contractors,”201 it will
still not address all of the manifestations of the salience of sex in the
sharing economy. This is for a number of reasons related to the nature
of transactions in the sharing economy. First, intimacy exceptions to
antidiscrimination law will tend to be more relevant in the sharing
economy, as will the lack of protection against customer
discrimination.202 Second, and perhaps even more importantly
(because these intimacy exceptions could be eliminated, at least in
theory), even when antidiscrimination law applies, structural features
of the sharing economy make antidiscrimination law less effective and
reduce the law’s potential to have the transformative effect that it has
had in the traditional economy. These challenges that the sharing
economy poses to sex discrimination law are discussed in turn.
First, exceptions to and gaps in antidiscrimination law will be
particularly likely to be relevant to sharing economy transactions.
Employment discrimination law contains a “bona fide occupational
qualification” (BFOQ) exception to certain intimate work
circumstances.203 Employers relying on sex segregation to address
safety concerns in settings of intense intimacy is not unheard of in U.S.
law. One of the seminal early Title VII sex discrimination cases,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, was decided precisely on this ground.204 In that

201. See Lauren Weber, What if There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent
Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-therewere-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831
[https://perma.cc/HFD9-8ZR3].
202. Some of the inadequacy of law here would apply equally to the traditional
economy. Occupational segregation has proven quite resistant to legal challenge. See
EEOC v. Sears, 839 F.2d 302, 320-21 (1988) (crediting the lack of interest defense to
reject Title VII sex discrimination claim based in occupational segregation); Schultz,
supra note 11, at 1048-1066, 1109 (critiquing the lack of interest defense). Even
though some sharing economy firm policies (e.g., bonuses for driving at night or for
acceptance rates) might be subject to disparate impact challenges, these are
notoriously difficult to win. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 735, 738–40 (2006) (documenting low success rates of
disparate impact claims).
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(e)(1) (1964); Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work,
supra note 10, at 1190.
204. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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case, the Court held that an employer could rely on sex as a
qualification for the position of correctional officer because the
dangers that women made them unfit for the job.205 Dothard may be
distinguished, as prisons are already premised on the sex segregation
of prisoners.206 And a later decision by the Court rejected a BFOQ
defense that turned on the argument that sex discrimination was
necessary to protect women workers.207 But the possibility for
exceptions based on intimacy remains, not only due to safety concerns,
but also due to interests in privacy208 and sexual titillation.209
Intimacy exceptions also exist under fair housing law. First, federal
housing law contains a so-called “Mrs. Murphy” exception, which
exempts from antidiscrimination mandates dwellings intended to be
occupied by four or fewer families if the owner lives in one of the
units.210 Note, however, that even a Mrs. Murphy landlord must still
comply with fair housing law’s ban on posting discriminatory
advertisements.211 Second, as discussed above, at least one federal

205. Id. at 335 (“A woman’s relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum
security, unclassified penitentiary of the type Alabama now runs could be directly
reduced by her womanhood. There is a basis in fact for expecting that sex offenders
who have criminally assaulted women in the past would be moved to do so again if
access to women were established within the prison. There would also be a real risk
that other inmates, deprived of a normal heterosexual environment, would assault
women guards because they were women.”).
206. See David S Cohen, Keeping Men “Men” and Women Down: Sex Segretation, AntiEssentialism, and Masculinity, 25 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 509, 514 (2010) (citing state
statutes).
207. See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (rejecting
BFOQ defense in case where employer banned fertile female employees from working
with chemicals that presented safety risks to fetuses).
208. At their most substantial, these privacy interests arise in contexts where female
customers express preferences for female workers so as to avoid genital exposure to
male workers. Title VII has drawn the line in interpreting the BFOQ exception to sex
discrimination based in customer privacy preferences here. Compare Norwood v. Dale
Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (attendants responsible for cleaning
bathrooms); Brooks v. ACF Indus. Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (janitor
responsible for cleaning bathrooms); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80–1374–W,
1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (labor and delivery nurse); Backus v. Baptist
Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir.
1982) (same), with Olsen v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999)
(denying BFOQ for massage therapist); EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (denying BFOQ for health club instructors); EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp.
301 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (denying BFOQ for weight-loss center counselors).
209. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981); see
generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (discussing and explaining the
more lenient approach to privacy preferences than titillation preferences).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1968).
211. See id. At § 3603(c).
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appellate court has held that the right to intimate association protects
roommate relationships such that antidiscrimination law cannot
intervene in these decisions.212
Antidiscrimination law also lacks protection against customer
discrimination,213 which is particularly likely to arise in the sharing
economy given that it is service oriented, and that the intimacy of the
transactions tends to stoke discriminatory preferences. Not only does
antidiscrimination law contain no ban on customer discrimination per
se, but it also does little to stand in the way of employers cultivating
and reinforcing discriminatory preferences in customers.214
Second, structural features of the sharing economy will tend to make
antidiscrimination law less effective there. One of the primary benefits
for which employment discrimination law has been justly celebrated is
providing a place of integration.215 Professor Cynthia Estlund has
argued that the application of antidiscrimination mandates in the
workplace has created a space where coworkers can come together in
a more integrated setting than they would otherwise find in their
neighborhoods, schools, or other third places of public
accommodation.216 Relying on the contact hypothesis, Estlund argues
that this means that employment discrimination law plays a critical
role in improving race relations and race equality norms.217
While Estlund’s focus is on race, we can expand her argument to
gender. One might think that men and women already have plenty of
contact in the home and in a variety of third places such as bars. But
what the workplace setting and employment discrimination law bring
are an opportunity for men and women to interact as coworkers in
settings where norms of equality prevail, allowing the interaction to
change the nature of gender relations in a way that does not occur in

212. See supra, notes 97-98 and accompanying text. As discussed above, it is not
clear whether this decision would apply to shared dwellings in the sharing economy
context because those relationships are not as intimate due to their shorter duration.
213. See Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, supra note 10, at 1189–91; Bartlett
&
Gulati,
Discrimination
by
Customers
(Nov.
13,
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540334
[https://perma.cc/SCS6-53N9]. Because 42 U.S.C. § 1981 bans race discrimination in
contracting, it would apply to customer discrimination, but it has never been deployed
this way. See Bartlett & Gulati, supra, at 4 n.8; IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE:
UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 127-36 (2001) (discussing
how § 1981 could apply to customer discrimination).
214. See supra, text accompany notes 159-60.
215. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 19.

44

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIII

other settings. We can see the role that law has played in changing
norms of male-female interaction quite clearly in the context of sexual
harassment.218
Critically, however, employment discrimination law’s role in
changing these norms turns not only on the law itself, but also on the
structural features of the workplace in which the law operates. Part of
the mechanism by which antidiscrimination law changes norms is
through the presence of coworkers and the contact that they have with
each other.219 Building relationships in a context of equality helps to
improve race and gender relations. But in the sharing economy, even if
the law applies, there is no workplace and no coworkers. What is left
is the relationship between the seller and the buyer. There is reason to
believe that the application of antidiscrimination law in this type of
setting will not have so beneficial an effect on norms. In such settings,
interactions between buyers and sellers take place in a context of
hierarchy, and are not as regular as those of the daily interactions
between coworkers.220
The lack of coworkers may also undermine the enforcement of
antidiscrimination law.221 As an initial matter, given the reliance on
comparators as the primary mechanism for proving discrimination,222
it is unclear how discrimination would even be established in many
cases in the sharing economy. Moreover, because antidiscrimination
law turns largely on private rights of enforcement, workers’ legal
consciousness must be raised for a legal violation to be recognized and
a claim to be made in the first instance.223 With this understanding of
the enforcement of employment discrimination law, coworkers
become a critical part of the enforcement mechanism.

218. See Nadler & Bilz, supra note 13, at 101.
219. See Estlund, Working Together, supra note 215, at 19.
220. See id. at 25 (describing the conditions in which the contact hypothesis is likely
to hold true, including conditions of regular interaction and non-hierarchy).
221. See Naomi Schoenbaum, Coworkers in Law (unpublished manuscript arguing
that coworkers are essential to work law and work life, including through aiding in the
enforcement of work law).
Note that one sector of the sharing economy—the co-working firm—would provide
workers with something like coworkers, even when workers are self-employed or
labor for different firms. See Davidson & Infranca, supra note 6, at 15-16 (discussing
the phenomena of co-working firms).
222. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 750
(2011).
223. See Amy Blackstone, et al., Legal Consciousness and Responses to Sexual
Harassment, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (2009) (discussing the importance of legal
consciousness to rights claiming).
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First, the support that coworkers provide raises legal consciousness.
“[T]he presence of close work friends . . . is a strong and consistent
predictor of [legal] mobilization.”224 Because coworkers have often
undergone similar experiences, they are thus well placed to confirm a
worker’s sense of a violation, a necessary precondition to exercising
voice.225 And talking to coworkers who have already complained to
the employer can lead a worker to see that she too “can speak up if
something like this happens.”226 Coworkers’ experience also allows
them to provide informed guidance about possible rights’ violations.227
Obtaining such information is essential before complaining of
discrimination because retaliation protection attaches only once the
employee reasonably believes there has been a violation.228
Second, mutually supportive behavior that arises from coworker
bonds sets the stage for collective action that helps to enforce
antidiscrimination law.229 This is especially important given the role
that the fear of retaliation plays in deterring workers from challenging
discrimination.230 When a group of employees complain, it is harder
for the employer to pin the blame on any individual worker, and the
employer may be unwilling to terminate or otherwise retaliate against
a large swath of workers.
Third, strong coworker relationships obviate the need for complaint
by preventing violations from occurring in the first place. Supportive
work cultures with high coworker solidarity have been linked with
lower incidences of sexual harassment.231
The structural features that make many sharing economy
transactions more intimate will also limit the effectiveness of
antidiscrimination law. The lack of norms against the exercise of sex

224. Id. at 646 (collecting studies); see also Abhijeet K. Verdara, et al., Making Sense
of Whistle-Blowing’s Antecedents: Learning from Research on Identity and Ethics
Programs, 19 BUS. ETHICS. Q. 553 (2009) (workplace culture with higher incidence of
coworker friendship is linked with a greater incidence of whistleblowing).
225. Blackstone, supra note 223, at 655–57 (explaining how relationships shape
perceptions of having been wronged); Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice,
Risking Retaliation: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J.
OCC. HEALTH PSYCH. 247, 249 (2003).
226. Id. (quoting research subject).
227. See Schoenbaum, supra note 225, at 14-20.
228. See supra notes 223-225.
229. See supra Part I.B.1.
230. See Deborah Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20, 37 n.58 (2005)
(compiling studies showing that “[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people
stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination”).
231. See Blackstone, supra note 223, at 635 (collecting studies finding that the
presence of coworker bonds is associated with lower incidence of discrimination).
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preferences in intimate settings will make any law that bans these
preferences less likely to be enforced. Because antidiscrimination law
is largely enforced through private rights of action, the violation of
norms will often be a necessary predicate to raising legal
consciousness and taking legal action.232 And the fact that sharing
economy transactions take place in a private setting with little
monitoring not only makes the operation of antidiscrimination norms
less effective, but also makes the operation of antidiscrimination law
less effective.233 The decreased likelihood of detection lowers the
expected cost of non-compliance, making non-compliance more
likely.234 Scholars have posited that employers themselves can and do
play a significant role in implementing antidiscrimination law.235 But
firms will have a much harder time doing this in the case of
disaggregated and private transactions of the sharing economy that
take place without any workplace.
4.

New Directions

While this Article does not take on the task of prescribing new
approaches that could cure the legal shortcomings just discussed,236 a
few words addressing possible future directions for law are in order.
First, regulating the information on which buyers and sellers can rely
could successfully reduce discrimination while potentially better
fulfilling preferences of buyers and sellers. In the employment context,
for example, limiting employers’ access to information about a
prospective employee’s membership in a protected class is a key
strategy the law relies on to reduce discrimination at the hiring
stage.237
One way to restrict discrimination in the sharing economy is to bar
buyers and sellers from learning the sex of prospective transacting
parties. Banning access to such information may in fact lead to better

232. See Blackstone, supra note 223, at 633-34.
233. See Strahilevitz, supra note 60, at 1759-65.
234. Id.
235. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005); Sturm, supra note 61, at 460.
236. Future work will explore identity preferences and discrimination in the sharing
economy and will have more to say on this.
237. See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That You Know: The Shortcomings of
Ignorance as Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting”
Model, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99 (2007). Federal employment discrimination law
regards employers’ preemployment inquiries regarding prospective employees’
protected trait status as evidence of discrimination, and some state law prohibits such
inquires. Id. at 137.
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fulfillment of the preferences of transacting parties, as they can no
longer rely on sex as a proxy for the traits they seek, and must rely on
other information that may prove to be more highly correlated with
the traits they are seeking. For example, if a buyer or seller is looking
for a transacting party who will provide a more intimate transaction by
sharing personal information, it will likely be more effective to seek a
person with this trait rather than to rely on female sex as a proxy for
this trait. Self-disclosure or reviews by other users could reveal
information about such traits.238 Prohibiting access to information
about gender might be enough to spur sharing economy firms to make
available other information on which transacting parties could rely to
satisfy their preferences. If not, the law might come up with incentives
for firms to do so.
Another approach to addressing discrimination in the sharing
economy would place a legal obligation on firms not to cultivate or
reinforce discriminatory preferences of transacting parties. Scholars
have begun to explore proposals to this effect in other contexts in the
traditional economy,239 and one could imagine that this type of
proposal could be extended to the sharing economy. In fact, the
technology on which sharing economy firms rely would mitigate the
burden of complying with such a mandate. The fact that users select
and review transacting parties online makes it easy for firms to
monitor the behavior of their users through algorithms that would
track whether users were disproportionately acting on sex (e.g., by
rejecting or negatively reviewing transacting parties of one sex or the
other).240 Although the tracking of user conduct by sharing economy
firms might raise privacy concerns,241 there does not seem to be a

238. See Strahilevitz, supra note 60, at 1755-58, 1762, 1764-65 (proposing review
system with commentary as a way to provide meaningful feedback in the context of
driving, suggesting criteria for extension to other contexts, and giving the behavior of
hotel guests as well as a number of online communities as examples). These reviews
themselves may be infected with bias, although the algorithm suggested below, see
infra note 240 and accompanying text, could help to ameliorate this problem.
239. See Schoenbaum, Intimate Work, supra note 10, at 1238-39 (arguing in the
context of intimate work that “[e]mployers should be held responsible for the
affirmative acts they take that cultivate and reinforce discriminatory preferences” of
workers and customers); Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 213, at 36 (proposing the
following law that would address customer discrimination: “any individual or entity
with a legal obligation not to discriminate on the basis of race or gender in its
employment or public accommodation practices also has an obligation not to facilitate
discrimination by its customers of which it is, or should be, aware, nor to discriminate
when it acts as a customer”).
240. See id. at 1733-34 (proposing use of algorithms to weed out malicious feedback
in “How’s My Driving” system).
241. See Davidson & Infranca, supra note 6, at 18 n.109.
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strong privacy interest in this non-intimate information,242 and the
interest in rooting out discrimination would likely trump any interest
in privacy.
CONCLUSION
New technologies can bring with them hope about transformative
possibilities for the future. And while innovations may contribute to
significant progress of all sorts, including for gender equality we
should be skeptical that technological progress inevitably leads to
progress of other sorts.243 But note that the sharing economy may also
give us reason to be optimistic. The pervasiveness of intimacy across
the sharing economy could provide the motivation that spurs
innovative regulatory responses to the challenge of combatting
discrimination in intimate spaces, which would be beneficial not only
in the sharing economy, but across all intimate transactions in the
economy.

242. See Strahilevitz, supra note 60, at 1743 n.188 (noting that information related
to intimate conduct present the strongest case for privacy protection).
243. See Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love, supra note 125, at 10 n.20 (explaining
that market innovations—”an increase in the purchases of housework replacement
services or goods, such as carry-out food and laundry services”– rather than
technological innovations reduced women’s domestic workload).

